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Abstract
As more attention is paid to security in the context of control systems and as attacks occur to real control systems throughout
the world, it has become clear that some of the most nefarious attacks are those that evade detection. The term stealthy has
come to encompass a variety of techniques that attackers can employ to avoid being detected. In this manuscript, for a class of
perturbed linear time-invariant systems, we propose two security metrics to quantify the potential impact that stealthy attacks
could have on the system dynamics by tampering with sensor measurements. We provide analysis mathematical tools (in terms
of linear matrix inequalities) to quantify these metrics for given system dynamics, control structure, system monitor, and set
of sensors being attacked. Then, we provide synthesis tools (in terms of semidefinite programs) to redesign controllers and
monitors such that the impact of stealthy attacks is minimized and the required attack-free system performance is guaranteed.
Key words: Network Control Systems; Model-based fault/attack monitors, Security Metrics, Secure Control, Attacker
Capabilities.
1 Introduction
Recently, there has been significant interest and work
in the broad area of security of Networked Control Sys-
tems (NCSs), see, e.g., [1,2,7,21,23,26,28,29,30,32,38].
This topic investigates properties of conventional con-
trol systems in the presence of adversarial disturbances.
Control theory has shown great ability to robustly deal
with disturbances and uncertainties. However, adversar-
ial attacks raise all-new issues due to the aggressive and
strategic nature of the disturbances that attackers might
inject into the system.
This paper focuses on quantifying and minimizing at-
tacker capabilities in NCSs. A majority of the work on
attack detection leverages the established literature of
fault detection [7,9,22,32]. A fault detection approach
uses an estimator to forecast the evolution of the sys-
tem dynamics. When the residual (the difference be-
tween measurements and their estimates) is larger than
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a predetermined threshold, an alarm is raised. Arguably
the most insidious attacks are those that occur with-
out our knowledge. Fault detectors impose limits on at-
tacks if the attacker aims at avoiding being identified.
Beyond retooling these existing methods for the new at-
tack detection context, a fundamental question is: given
a chosen fault detection approach, how does this method
constrain the influence of an attacker? More specifically,
what is an attacker able to accomplish when a system
employs certain fault detection procedure?
Different methodologies exist for evaluating the impact
of attacks. Most of the existing work uses some mea-
sure of state deviation. A number of groups have stud-
ied the system response when attacks are constrained
by the detector, i.e., they investigate the system trajec-
tories that can be induced due to stealthy attacks – at-
tacks such that the detector threshold is never crossed
[8,12,14,16,28,31,32]. In this manuscript, for given sys-
tem dynamics, we provide mathematical tools for quan-
tifying and minimizing the potential impact of sensor
stealthy attacks on the system dynamics. We consider
the set of states that stealthy attacks can induce in the
system (the attacker’s stealthy reachable set) and use
the “size” of this set as a security metric for the NCS.
Stealthy reachable sets provide a metric of the system
performance degradation induced by stealthy attacks.
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Because it is not mathematically tractable to compute
these sets exactly, we provide analysis tools – in terms
of Linear Matrix Inequalities (LMIs) – for computing
ellipsoidal outer approximations of the attacker’s reach-
able sets. The obtained approximations quantify the at-
tacker’s potential impact when it is constrained to stay
hidden from the detector. We use the size (in terms of
volume) of these ellipsoidal approximations to approxi-
mate the proposed security metric. As a second security
metric, we propose the minimum distance from the at-
tacker’s reachable set to a possible set of critical states –
states that, if reached, compromise the integrity or safe
operation of the system. We approximate this distance
by the minimum distance between the ellipsoidal ap-
proximations and the critical states. This distance gives
us intuition on how far the actual attacker’s reachable
set is from the critical states. Once we have provided a
complete set of analysis tools to approximate the afore-
mentioned security metrics, we use these tools to derive
synthesis tools (in terms of semidefinite programs) to re-
design controllers and fault detectors such that the im-
pact of stealthy attacks is minimized and the required
attack-free system performance is guaranteed.
There are a few results in this direction already; chiefly
the work in [27] (and the preliminary paper [26]), where
the authors provide a recursive algorithm to compute el-
lipsoidal approximations of attacker’s reachable sets for
Linear Time Invariant (LTI) systems subjected to Gaus-
sian noise. The authors in [27] give analysis-only results
for a very particular structure of controllers and fault-
detectors. They consider Kalman-filter based fault de-
tectors and use the state of the filter to construct output
feedback controllers. Although this results in compact
designs of controllers and fault detectors, the flexibility
of having dedicated controllers and detectors (mainly for
synthesis of secure control systems) is limited. We re-
mark that, in the stochastic setting considered in [27],
the detector threshold is always crossed even when there
are no attacks. This is due to the infinite support of the
Gaussian noise they consider. Thus, they do not consider
stealthy attacks in the sense described above. Instead,
they consider attacks that increase the alarm rate of the
detector by a small amount only. Then, they approxi-
mate the attacker’s reachable set corresponding to this
small increase.
The main contributions of this manuscript (in contrast
to the work in [27]) are the following: 1) we provide a
set of mathematical tools in terms of semidefinite pro-
grams to approximate reachable sets induced by stealthy
attacks for LTI systems driven by peak bounded deter-
ministic perturbations; 2) we provide both analysis and
synthesis results for dedicated general dynamic output
feedback controllers and observer-based fault detectors;
3) we propose two security metrics to assess the vulner-
ability of systems to attacks, and optimize these met-
rics (enhancing thus the system resilience to attacks)
by synthesizing optimal controllers and detectors; 4) the
synthesis part considers the attack-free performance of
the closed-loop dynamics, i.e., we optimize the security
metrics subject to certain prescribed attack-free system
performance. In our preliminary work [31], we also ap-
proximate reachable sets of false-data-injection attacks
but we consider the same stochastic framework as the
one proposed in [27], i.e., Gaussian noise, joint Kalman-
filter based fault detectors and controllers, and attacks
increasing the alarm rate of the detector. Thus, the prob-
lems considered in this manuscript (and the obtained
results) and the ones addressed in [31] are fundamen-
tally different; and the set of results (and the tools used
to obtain them) are different too. Moreover, in [31], we
consider attacks to all the sensors. Although the latter
case provides a worse-case scenario, we lose the capabil-
ity of quantifying the sensitivity of the system dynamics
to attacks on specific sensors. As in [27], the results in
[31] mainly focus on analysis (although they hint how to
address synthesis for joint Kalman-filter based detectors
and controllers).
There are a few other results that considers different se-
curity metrics for control systems. All of them are fun-
damentally different to the work presented here. For in-
stance, in [2,3], for arbitrary detection procedures, the
authors quantify how much the attacker can increase the
asymptotic covariance (their security metric) of state
estimates while remaining stealthy. They characterize
stealthiness using the Kullback-Leibler Divergence [33]
between the attack-free and the attacked estimates. In
[37,39], the authors use the notion of security index for
LTI systems. This index refers to the smallest number
of sensors and actuators that have to be compromised
for successfully launching stealthy attacks. For linear
stochastic systems, the authors is [24] propose two se-
curity metrics: the probability that some of the critical
states leave a safety region; and the expected value of
the infinity norm of the critical states. Finally, in [25],
tools from finance risk theory are used to quantify secu-
rity of LTI systems.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we present some preliminaries results needed
for the subsequent sections. We provide tools for com-
puting outer time-varying bounds on the trajectories
of a class of perturbed nonlinear discrete-time systems.
Then, we use these tools to obtain outer ellipsoidal ap-
proximations of reachable sets of LTI systems driven by
multiple peak bounded perturbations. The system dy-
namics, monitor, and controller descriptions are given
in Section 3. Our proposed security metrics and analy-
sis tools, together with some numerical results, are given
in Section 4; and the corresponding synthesis results are
given in Section 5. Finally, conclusions and recommen-
dations are stated in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we present some preliminary results
needed for the subsequent sections. First, in Lemma 1,
we present a preliminary tool used to compute outer
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time-varying bounds on the trajectories of perturbed
discrete-time systems. Next, in Proposition 1, we use
this lemma to compute outer ellipsoidal approximations
of reachable sets of LTI systems driven by multiple peak
bounded perturbations.
Lemma 1 For a given a ∈ (0, 1), if there exist functions
aik : N → (0, 1), i = 1, . . . , N , and V : Rnξ → R≥0
satisfying
∑N
i=1 a
i
k ≥ a and, for all k ∈ N, the inequality:
V (ξk+1)− aV (ξk)−
N∑
i=1
(1− aik)(ωik)TW ik ωik ≤ 0; (1)
then, V (ξk) ≤ αk, whereαk := ak−1V (ξ1)+ (N−a)(1−a
k−1)
1−a ,
and limk→∞ V (ζk) ≤ N−a1−a .
Proof: By assumption, (ωik)
TW ik ω
i
k ≤ 1, for i =
1, . . . , N ; then, from (1), we have
V (ξk+1) ≤ aV (ξk) +
N∑
i=1
(1− aik) (ωik)TW ik ωik︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
≤ aV (ξk) + (N − a), (2)
because
∑N
i=1 a
i
k ≥ a. It follows that
V (ξk) ≤ aV (ξk−1) + (N − a), (3)
V (ξk−1) ≤ aV (ξk−2) + (N − a). (4)
Using (4) to upper bound (3) and continuing the recur-
sion yields
V (ξk) ≤ ak−1V (ξ1) + (N − a)(1− a
k−1)
1− a .
Therefore, limk→∞ V (ζk) ≤ (N − a)/(1 − a) because
a ∈ (0, 1). 
Next, we present a tool to identify outer ellipsoidal ap-
proximations of reachable sets of LTI systems driven by
multiple peak bounded perturbations.
Consider the perturbed LTI system
ξk+1 = Aξk +
N∑
i=1
Biωik, (5)
with k ∈ N, state ξk ∈ Rnξ , initial condition ξ1 ∈ Rnξ ,
perturbation ωik ∈ Rpi satisfying (ωik)TWi ωik ≤ 1
for some positive definite matrix Wi ∈ Rpi×pi ,
i = 1, . . . , N , N ∈ N, and matrices A ∈ Rnξ×nξ and
Bi ∈ Rnξ×pi . Denote by ψξ(k, ξ1, ω1(·), · · · , ωN (·)) :=
Ak−1ξ1 +
∑N
i=1
∑k−2
j=0 A
jBiωik−1−j the solution of (5)
at time instant k > 1 given the initial condition ξ1 and
the infinite disturbance sequence ωi(·) := {ωi1, ωi2, . . .}.
Definition 1 The reachable set Rξk at time instant
k > 1 from the initial condition ξ1 is the set of states
ψξ(k, ξ1, ω
1(·), · · · , ωN (·)) reachable in k steps by sys-
tem (5) through all possible perturbations satisfying
(ωik)
TWiω
i
k ≤ 1, i.e.,
Rξk :=
{
ξ ∈ Rnξ
∣∣∣∣∣ ξ = ψξ(k, ξ1, ω1(·), · · · , ωN (·)),ξ1 ∈ Rnξ , and (ωik)TWiωik ≤ 1.
}
.
Proposition 1 Consider the LTI system (5) and the
reachable set Rξk introduced in Definition 1. For a given
a ∈ (0, 1), if there exist constants a1 = a˜1, . . . , aN = a˜N
and matrix P = P˜ ∈ Rnξ×nξ satisfying:
a1, . . . , aN ∈ (0, 1), a1 + · · ·+ aN ≥ a,
P > 0,
aP ATP 0PA P PB
0 BTP Wai
 ≥ 0; (6)
with Wai := diag[(1− a1)W1, . . . , (1− aN )WN ] ∈ Rp¯×p¯,
B := (B1, . . . , BN ) ∈ Rnξ×p¯, and p¯ = ∑Ni=1 pi; then,
Rξk ⊆ E˜ξk := {ξ ∈ Rnξ | ξT P˜ξ ≤ α˜ξk}, where α˜ξk :=
ak−1ξT1 P˜ξ1 +
(
(N − a)(1− ak−1))/(1− a).
Proof: For a positive definite matrix P ∈ Rnξ×nξ , let
Vk = ξ
T
k Pξk in Lemma 1. Substituting this Vk, the dy-
namics ξk+1 = Aξk+Bωk, with stacked vector of pertur-
bations ωk := ((ω
1
k)
T , . . . , (ωNk )
T )T , and the inequality
a1 + · · ·+ aN ≥ a in (1) yields
νTk
[P −ATPA −ATPB
−BTPA Wai −BTPB
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q
νk ≥ 0,
with νk :=
(
ξTk , ω
T
k
)T
. This inequality is satisfied if and
only if Q is positive semidefinite. This Q can be written
as the Schur complement of a higher dimensional matrix
Q′; it follows that Q ≥ 0↔ Q′ ≥ 0 where
Q′ :=
 P 0 ATP0 Wai BTPPA PB P
 .
Consider the congruence transformation Q′ → T TQ′T ,
T :=
[
I 0 0
0 0 I
0 I 0
]
.
Hence, Q ≥ 0 ↔ Q′ ≥ 0 ↔ T TQ′T ≥ 0, see [5]
for details. Inequality T TQ′T ≥ 0 equals the last in-
equality in (6). Then, by Lemma 1, we have ξTk P˜ξk ≤
ak−1ξT1 P˜ξ1 +
(
(N − a)(1 − ak−1))/(1 − a) = α˜ξk for
any ai = a˜i, i = 1, . . . ,m, and P = P˜ satisfying (6).
It follows that the trajectories ξk generated by ξk+1 =
Aξk +
∑N
i=1B
iωik, the initial condition ξ1, and the per-
turbation ωk, are always contained in the time-varying
ellipsoid E˜ξk , i.e., Rξk ⊆ E˜ξk . 
Remark 1 Note that the contribution of the initial con-
dition ξ1 to the sequence α˜
ξ
k vanishes exponentially. We
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Fig. 1. Tightness of the ellipsoidal outer approximations of
reachable sets obtained by Corollary 1.
have that limk→∞ α˜
ξ
k = (N − a)/(1− a); therefore
lim
k→∞
E˜ξk = {ξ ∈ Rnξ | ξT P˜ξ ≤ (N − a)/(1− a)} =: E˜ξ∞.
(7)
That is, E˜ξ∞ provides an ultimate bound [17] for the time-
varying ellipsoidal approximation E˜ξk .
Proposition 1 provides a tool for computing time-varying
ellipsoidal outer approximations E˜ξk of Rξk. Note that E˜ξk
could be an arbitrarily conservative approximation ofRξk
as long as Rξk ⊆ E˜ξk . Then, to make E˜ξk less conservative,
we aim at obtaining ellipsoids with minimal volume, i.e.,
the tightest possible ellipsoid bounding Rξk among all
the ellipsoids generated by Proposition 1. To find such
an ellipsoid, we look to minimize (det[P])−1/2 subject to
(6) because (det[P])−1/2 is proportional to the volume of
the asymptotic ellipsoid ξTPξ = (N−a)/(1−a) for any
N ∈ N and a ∈ (0, 1) [5]. We minimize log det[P−1] in-
stead as it shares the same minimizer with (det[P])−1/2
and because for positive definite P this objective is con-
vex [5]. This is stated in the following corollary of Propo-
sition 1.
Corollary 1 Consider the perturbed LTI system (5)
and the reachable set Rξk introduced in Definition
1. For a given a ∈ (0, 1), if there exist constants
a1 = a
∗
1, . . . , aN = a
∗
N and matrix P = P∗ solution of
the convex optimization:{
min
P,a1,...,aN
− log det[P],
s.t. (6);
(8)
then, Rξk ⊆ Eξk := {ξ ∈ Rnξ | ξTP∗ξ ≤ αξk}, where
αξk := a
k−1ξT1 P∗ξ1 +
(
(N−a)(1−ak−1))/(1−a). More-
over, for any ai = a˜i 6= a∗i and P = P˜ 6= P∗ satisfying
the constraints in (6) and corresponding ellipsoidal ap-
proximation E˜ξk , the volume of Eξ∞ (see (7)) is strictly less
than the volume of E˜ξ∞, i.e., Eξk has the minimum asymp-
totic volume among all the outer ellipsoidal approxima-
Fig. 2. Cyber-physical system under sensor attacks.
tions E˜ξk generated by Proposition 1.
Proof: The solution space of the objective function is
convex because the constraints are linear [6]. Moreover,
the function log det[P−1] is convex for any positive defi-
nite matrixP [5]. Hence, Corollary 1 follows from Propo-
sition 1, convexity of the solution space, and convexity
of the objective function. 
Remark 2 Note that the constant a ∈ (0, 1) in Corol-
lary 1 must be fixed before solving (8). This constant
is, in fact, a variable of the optimization problem. How-
ever, to convexify the cost and linearize some of the con-
straints, we fix its value before solving (8) and search
over a ∈ (0, 1) to find the optimal P∗. The latter in-
creases the computations needed to find P∗; however, be-
cause a ∈ (0, 1) (a bounded set), the required grid is of
reasonable size. Indeed, we are interested in selecting the
a ∈ (0, 1) that leads to the asymptotic ellipsoid with min-
imum volume.
In Figure 1, we illustrate the potential tightness of the
ellipsoidal outer approximations obtained using Corol-
lary 1. The solid gray area is the actual reachable set
obtained by extensive Monte Carlo simulations, and the
ellipsoidal approximation is depicted with dashed lines.
This figure corresponds to an LTI system driven by two
peak bounded perturbation. The exact numerical values
of the system matrices and the perturbations’ bounds
can be found in [16, Section 4].
3 System & Monitor Description
In this section, we introduce the system dynamics that
we consider, the monitor that we use to pinpoint attacks,
and the control scheme.
3.1 System Dynamics
Consider the LTI perturbed system{
xp(tk+1) = A
pxp(tk) +B
pu(tk) + Ev(tk),
y(tk) = C
pxp(tk) + Fη(tk),
(9)
with sampling time-instants tk, k ∈ N, state xp ∈ Rn,
output y ∈ Rm, control input u ∈ Rl, matrices Ap, Bp,
Cp, E, and F of appropriate dimensions, and unknown
system and sensor perturbations v ∈ Rq and η ∈ Rm,
respectively. The perturbations are assumed to be peak
bounded, i.e., vTk vk ≤ v¯ and ηTk ηk ≤ η¯ for some known
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v¯, η¯ ∈ R>0 and all k ∈ N. The pair (Ap, Bp) is stabi-
lizable and (Ap, Cp) is detectable. At the time-instants
tk, k ∈ N, the output of the process y(tk) is sampled
and transmitted over a communication network. The re-
ceived output y¯(tk) is used to compute control actions
u(tk) which are sent back to the actuators. The com-
plete control-loop is assumed to be performed instanta-
neously, i.e., sampling, transmission, and arrival time-
instants are equal. In this manuscript, we focus on false
data injection attacks on sensor measurements. That is,
in between transmission and reception of sensor data,
an attacker may inject data to the signals coming from
sensors to the controller, see Fig. 6. The opponent com-
promises up to s sensors, s ∈ {1, . . . ,m} of the system.
Denote the attacker’s sensor selection matrix Γ ∈ Rm×s,
Γ ⊆ {γ1, . . . , γm} where γi ∈ Rm×1 denotes the i-th vec-
tor of the canonical basis of Rm. After each transmission
and reception, the networked output y¯ takes the form:
y¯(tk) := y(tk) + Γδ(tk), (10)
where δ(tk) ∈ Rs denotes additive sensor attacks/faults.
Denote xk := x(tk), uk := u(tk), vk := v(tk), y¯k :=
y¯(tk), ηk := η(tk), and δk := δ(tk). Using this new no-
tation, the attacked system is written in the following
compact form:{
xpk+1 = A
pxpk +B
puk + Evk,
y¯k = C
pxpk + Fηk + Γδk.
(11)
3.2 Filter and Residual
In this manuscript, we aim at characterizing the effect
that false data injection attacks can induce in the sys-
tem without being detected by standard fault-detectors.
The main idea behind fault detection is the use of an es-
timator to forecast the evolution of the system state. If
the difference between what it is measured and the out-
put estimation is larger than expected, there may be a
fault in or an attack on the system. Here, to estimate
the state of the process, we use the filter:
xˆk+1 = A
pxˆk +B
puk + L
(
y¯k − Cpxˆk
)
, (12)
with estimated state xˆ ∈ Rn, xˆ1 = (Cp)+y1, where
(Cp)+ denotes the Moore-Penrose inverse of Cp, and fil-
ter gain matrix L ∈ Rn×m. Define the estimation error
ek := x
p
k − xˆk. Given the system dynamics (11) and the
filter (12), the estimation error is governed by the fol-
lowing difference equation
ek+1 =
(
Ap − LCp)ek − LΓδk − LFηk + Evk. (13)
The pair (Ap, Cp) is detectable; hence, the observer gain
L can be selected such that (Ap − LCp) is Schur. We
assume that L is such that (Ap − LCp) is Schur. Define
the residual rk ∈ Rm
rk := y¯k − Cpxˆk = Cpek + Γδk + Fηk, (14)
which evolves according to the difference equation:{
ek+1 =
(
Ap − LCp)ek − LΓδk − LFηk + Evk,
rk = C
pek + Γδk + Fηk.
(15)
3.3 Distance Measure, Anomaly Detection, and System
Monitor
The input to any detection procedure is a distance mea-
sure zk ∈ R, i.e., a measure of how deviated the estima-
tor is from the attack-free system dynamics [13]. Here,
we use a quadratic form of the residual as distance mea-
sure. Consider the residual sequence rk and some posi-
tive definite matrix Π ∈ Rm×m. Define the distance mea-
sure zk := r
T
k Πrk and consider the following monitor.
System Monitor:
If zk = r
T
k Πrk > 1, k˜ = k. (16)
Design parameter: positive semidefinite matrix Π ∈
Rm×m.
Output: alarm time(s) k˜.
Thus, the monitor is designed so that alarms are trig-
gered if zk exceeds one. The matrix Π must be selected
such that, after sufficiently large number of time-steps
(enough to allow transients to settle down), zk ≤ 1 in the
attack-free case. That is, after transients due to initial
conditions have decreased to a desired level, the ellip-
soid rTk Πrk = 1 must contain all the possible trajectories
that the perturbations vk and ηk can induce in the resid-
ual given Eq. (15) and the inequalities vTk vk ≤ v¯ and
ηTk ηk ≤ η¯. Note that the tighter the ellipsoidal bound,
the less opportunity the attacker has to manipulate the
system without being detected. Here, we use Corollary
1 to design an optimal matrix Π (in terms of tightness
of the ellipsoidal bound). In particular, using Corollary
1, we obtain an outer time-varying ellipsoidal approxi-
mation of the reachable set of the estimation error (13)
driven by vk and ηk in the attack-free case (δk = 0).
Once we have this ellipsoid, using the S-procedure [5], we
project it onto the residual hyperplane to get the ellip-
soid rTk Πrk = 1 of the monitor. For transparency, these
results are presented in the appendix. We need, however,
the following assumption for the subsequent sections.
Assumption 1 In the attack-free case (δk = 0), there
exists some k∗ ∈ N such that the matrix Π of the monitor
satisfies rTk Πrk ≤ 1 ∀ k ≥ k∗ and rk solution of (15).
In the appendix, we give tools for obtaining a matrix Π
satisfying Assumption 1 for a desired k∗ as a function
of the initial estimation error e1 and a desired tightness
level of the ellipsoidal bound.
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Fig. 3. (a) Stealthy reachable set RxΓ,k; (b) ellipsoidal outer approximation ExΓ,k of RxΓ,k; and (c) the volume of ExΓ,k as an
approximation of the security metric (the volume of RxΓ,k).
3.4 Dynamic Output Feedback Controller
We consider general dynamic output feedback con-
trollers of the form:{
xck+1 = A
cxck +B
cy¯k,
uk = C
cxck +D
cy¯k,
(17)
with controller state xc ∈ Rn, networked output y¯, con-
trol input u, and controller matrices (Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc)
of appropriate dimensions. For simplicity, we only con-
sider controllers with the same order as the plant. This
is particulary important in the synthesis section of the
manuscript (however, results for general order con-
trollers can be derived following the same approach).
The closed-loop system (11),(12),(17) can be written in
terms of the estimation error ek = xk − xˆk as follows:
xpk+1 = (A
p +BpDcCp)xpk +B
pCcxck
+BpDcFηk + Evk +B
pDcΓδk,
xck+1 = A
cxck +B
cCpxpk +B
cFηk +B
cΓδk,
ek+1 = (A
p − LCp)ek − LFηk + Evk − LΓδk.
(18)
4 Analysis Tools: Attacker’s Reachable Sets
In this section, we provide tools for quantifying (for
given (L,Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc)) and minimizing (by redesign-
ing (L,Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc)) the impact of the attack δk on
the state of the system when the monitor (16) is used for
attack detection. We are interested in attacks that keep
the monitor from raising alarms. This class of attacks is
what we refer to as stealthy attacks. Here, we character-
ize ellipsoidal bounds on the set of states that stealthy
attacks can induce in the system. In particular, we pro-
vide tools based on Linear Matrix Inequalities (LMIs)
for computing ellipsoidal bounds on the reachable set of
the attack sequence given the system dynamics, the con-
trol strategy, the system monitor, and the set of sensors
being attacked.
Assumption 2 We assume that the attack to system
(11),(12),(17) starts at k = k∗ (the monitor convergence
time), i.e., the system has been operating without attacks
for sufficiently long time so that the residual trajectories
rk, for k ≥ k∗, are contained in the monitor ellipsoid
{r ∈ Rm|rTΠr ≤ 1} before an attack occurs.
The attacker can compromise up to s sensors, s ∈
{1, . . . ,m}, of the system. Consider the monitor (16)
and write zk in terms of the estimation error ek and δk:
zk = r
T
k Πrk =
∥∥∥Π 12 (Cpek + Fηk + Γδk)∥∥∥2 , (19)
where Π
1
2 is the symmetric square root matrix of Π and
‖·‖ denotes Euclidian norm. The set of feasible attack
sequences that the attacker can launch while satisfying
zk ≤ 1 (i.e., without raising alarms by the monitor) can
be written as the constrained control problem on δk:{
δk ∈ Rm
∣∣∣∣∣
∥∥∥Π 12 (Cpek + Fηk + Γδk)∥∥∥2 ≤ 1,
and Eq. (18), ∀ k ≥ k∗,
}
. (20)
Define the extended state ζk := ((x
p
k)
T , (xck)
T , eTk )
T
and denote by ψζδ (k, ζk∗ , η(·), v(·), δ(·)) the solu-
tion of (18) at time instant k ≥ k∗ given the
extended state at the starting attack instant ζk∗
and the infinite disturbance and attack sequences
η(·) := {η1, η2, . . .}, v(·) := {v1, v2, . . .}, and δ(·) :=
{δ1, δ2, . . .}. Let ψxδ (k, ζk∗ , η(·), v(·), δ(·)) be the parti-
tion of ψζδ (k, ζk∗ , η(·), v(·), δ(·)) corresponding to the
plant trajectories, i.e., the solution xpk of (18). We are
interested in the state trajectories that the attacker can
induce in the system restricted to satisfy (20). To this
end, we introduce the notion of stealthy reachable set :
RxΓ,k :=
xp ∈ Rn
∣∣∣∣∣∣
xp = ψxδ (k, ζk∗ , η(·), v(·), δ(·)),
ζk∗ ∈ R3n, δk, ζk satisfy (20),
vTk vk ≤ v¯, ηTk ηk ≤ η¯,∀ k ≥ k∗
 .
(21)
In this manuscript, we propose to use the volume of the
set RxΓ,k as a security metric. However, in general, it is
not tractable to compute RxΓ,k exactly. Instead, we look
for an outer approximation ExΓ,k satisfying RxΓ,k ⊆ ExΓ,k
for all k ≥ k∗. In particular, for some positive defi-
nite PxΓ ∈ Rn×n and nonnegative function αxk, we look
for outer ellipsoidal approximations of the form ExΓ,k =
{xp ∈ Rn|(xp)TPxΓxp ≤ αxk} such that RxΓ,k ⊆ ExΓ,k.
That is, the ellipsoid (xp)TPxΓxp = αxk contains all the
possible trajectories that stealthy attacks of the form
(20) can induce in the system. Because, for LTI systems
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ExΓ,k is a good approximation of RxΓ,k, and because ExΓ,k
can be computed efficiently using LMIs, we use the vol-
ume of ExΓ,k as an approximation of the proposed secu-
rity metric. This approximation allows us to quantify
the potential “damage” that sensor attacks can induce
to the system in terms of the set of sensors being com-
promised (the attacker’s sensor selection matrix Γ). In
Figure 3, we depict a schematic representation of the
proposed ideas.
4.1 Analysis Tools
In (15), the residual is given by rk = C
pek + Γδk +Fηk.
Because Γ has full column rank by construction, we can
write the attack sequence as δk = Γ
+(rk−Cpek−Fηk),
where Γ+ denotes the Moore-Penrose inverse of Γ, and
the closed-loop dynamics (18) as
xpk+1 = (A
p +BpDcCp)xpk +B
pCcxck −BpDcΓΓ+Cpek
+BpDc(Im − ΓΓ+)Fηk + Evk +BpDcΓΓ+rk, (22)
xck+1 = A
cxck +B
cCpxpk −BcΓΓ+Cpek
+Bc(Im − ΓΓ+)Fηk +BcΓΓ+rk, (23)
ek+1 =
(
Ap − L(Im − ΓΓ+)Cp
)
ek
− L(Im − ΓΓ+)Fηk + Evk − LΓΓ+rk. (24)
Define the matrices:
A :=
Ap +BpDcCp BpCc −BpDcΓΓ+CpBcCp Ac −BcΓΓ+Cp
0 0 Ap − L(Im − ΓΓ+)Cp
 ,
B1 :=
BpDc(Im − ΓΓ+)FBc(Im − ΓΓ+)F
−L(Im − ΓΓ+)F
 ,B2 :=
E0
E
 ,
B3 :=
BpDcΓΓ+BcΓΓ+
−LΓΓ+
 ,B := [B1 B2 B3] .
(25)
Then, the closed-loop dynamics can be written in terms
of the extended state ζk = ((x
p
k)
T , (xck)
T , eTk )
T :
ζk+1 = Aζk + B1ηk + B2vk + B3rk, k ≥ k∗. (26)
Denote by ψζr (k, ζk∗ , η(·), v(·), r(·)) the solution of (26)
at time instant k ≥ k∗ given the extended state at the
starting attack instant ζk∗ and the infinite residual and
disturbance sequences r(·) := {r1, r2, . . .}, η(·), and v(·).
Define the reachable set:
RζΓ,k :=
ζ ∈ R3n
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ζ = ψζr (k, ζk∗ , η(·), v(·), r(·)),
ζk∗ ∈ R3n, rTk Πrk ≤ 1,
vTk vk ≤ v¯, ηTk ηk ≤ η¯,∀k ≥ k∗.
 .
(27)
The setRζΓ,k is the reachable set of an LTI system driven
by peak-bounded perturbations. Therefore, we can use
Corollary 1 to obtain outer approximations of the form
EζΓ,k = {ζ ∈ R3n|ζTPζΓζ ≤ αζk} such that RζΓ,k ⊆ EζΓ,k.
Remark 3 We are ultimately interested in the stealthy
reachable set of the plant states RxΓ,k introduced
in (21). Note that RxΓ,k is the projection of RζΓ,k
onto the xp-hyperplane. Hence, if RζΓ,k ⊆ EζΓ,k, then
RxΓ,k ⊆ EζΓ,k||xp =: ExΓ,k, where EζΓ,k||xp denotes the
projection of EζΓ,k onto the xp-hyperplane. Therefore, to
obtain the ellipsoid ExΓ,k containing RxΓ,k, we can first
obtain EζΓ,k containing RζΓ,k and then take EζΓ,k||xp to
obtain ExΓ,k.
Theorem 1 Consider the closed-loop dynamics (22)-
(24) with system matrices (Ap, Bp, Cp), observer gain
L, controller matrices (Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc), monitor matrix
Π, perturbations bounds v¯, η¯ ∈ R>0, and attack selection
matrix Γ. For a given a ∈ (0, 1), if there exist constants
a1 = a
∗
1, . . . , aN = a
∗
N and matrix P = P∗ solution of
(8) with A = A, N = 3, B1 = B1, B2 = B2, B3 = B3,
(A,B) as defined in (25), W1 = (1/η¯)Im, W2 = (1/v¯)In,
W3 = Π, p1 = m, p2 = n, and p3 = m; then, for all k ≥
k∗, RζΓ,k ⊆ EζΓ,k := {ζ ∈ R3n|ζTPζΓζ ≤ αζk}, with PζΓ :=
P∗ and αζk := ak−1ζTk∗P∗ζk∗+
(
(3−a)(1−ak−1))/(1−a),
and the ellipsoid EζΓ,k has minimum volume in the sense
of Corollary 1.
Proof: Consider the reachable set RζΓ,k in (27). The
set RζΓ,k is the reachable set of system (26), which is a
LTI system driven by peak-bounded perturbations. It
follows that, under the conditions stated in Theorem 1,
Corollary 1 can be used to obtain outer ellipsoidal ap-
proximations of the form EζΓ,k = {ζ ∈ R3n|ζTPζΓζ ≤ αζk}
such thatRζΓ,k ⊆ EζΓ,k, where the sequence αζk is given by
αζk = a
k−1ζTk∗P∗ζk∗+(3−a)(1−ak−1)/(1−a), PζΓ = P∗,
and P∗ is the solution of the optimization problem (8).
The volume of EζΓ,k is minimal in the sense of Corollary 1
because we solve (8) to obtain P∗. 
If the conditions of Theorem 1 are satisfied, for every
k ≥ k∗, the trajectories of the extended dynamics (26)
are contained in EζΓ,k. Having this ellipsoid, we look for
the projection EζΓ,k||xp to obtain the ellipsoidal approx-
imation ExΓ,k = {xp ∈ Rn|(xp)TPxΓxp ≤ αxk} such that
RxΓ,k ⊆ ExΓ,k. We use Lemma 10 in the Appendix to ob-
tain this projection.
Corollary 2 Let the conditions of Theorem 1 be satisfied
and consider the corresponding matrix PζΓ and function
αζk. Let PζΓ be partitioned as
PζΓ =:
[ Pζ1 Pζ2
(Pζ2 )T Pζ3
]
,
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with Pζ1 ∈ Rn×n, Pζ2 ∈ Rn×2n, and Pζ3 ∈ R2n×2n. Then,
for k ≥ k∗, RxΓ,k ⊆ ExΓ,k := {xp ∈ Rn|(xp)TPxΓxp ≤ αxk}
with PxΓ := Pζ1 − Pζ2 (Pζ3 )−1(Pζ2 )T and αxk := αζk.
Proof: By Theorem 1, the trajectories of (26) satisfy
ζTk PζΓζk ≤ αζk for k ≥ k∗. By Lemma 10 in the Appendix,
the projection of ζTk PζΓζk ≤ αζk onto the xp-hyperplane
is given by ExΓ,k defined above. Thus, in light of Remark
3, the trajectories of the plant dynamics are contained in
ExΓ,k, i.e., RxΓ,k ⊆ ExΓ,k for all k ≥ k∗. 
4.2 Distance to Critical States: Analysis
As a second security metric, we propose to use the min-
imum distance between RxΓ,k and a possible set of crit-
ical states Cx – states that, if reached, compromise the
integrity or safe operation of the system. Such a region
might represent states in which, for example, the pres-
sure of a holding vessel exceeds its pressure rating or the
level of a liquid in a tank exceeds its capacity. However,
because RxΓ,k is not known exactly, this distance can-
not be directly computed. Instead, once the ellipsoidal
bound ExΓ,k on RxΓ,k is obtained, we compute the mini-
mum distance dxΓ,k from ExΓ,k to Cx and use this dxΓ,k as
an approximation of the distance between RxΓ,k and Cx
in terms of the set of sensors being compromised (the
attacker’s sensor selection matrix Γ). The distance dxΓ,k
gives us intuition of how far the actual reachable setRxΓ,k
is from Cx.
The set of critical states in many practical applications
can be captured through the union of half-spaces defined
by their boundary hyperplanes:
Cx :=
{
xp ∈ Rn
∣∣∣∣∣
N⋃
i=1
cTi x
p ≥ bi
}
, (28)
where each pair (ci, bi), ci ∈ Rn, bi ∈ R, i = 1, . . . , N
quantifies a hyperplane that defines a single half-space.
Corollary 3 Consider the set of critical states Cx de-
fined in (28) and the matrix PxΓ and the function αxk
obtained in Theorem 1. The minimum distance, dxΓ,k,
between the outer ellipsoidal approximation of RxΓ,k,
ExΓ,k = {xp ∈ Rn|(xp)TPxΓxp ≤ αxk}, and Cx is given by
dxΓ,k = min
( |bi| −√cTi (PxΓ)−1ci/αxk
cTi ci
)
, i = 1, . . . , N.
(29)
Proof: The minimum distance between an ellipsoid cen-
tered at the origin {x ∈ Rn|xTPx = 1}, P ∈ Rn×n,
P > 0 and a hyperplane {x ∈ Rn|cTx = b}, c ∈ Rn,
b ∈ R is given by the formula (|b| −
√
cTP−1c)/cT c,
[19,20]. It follows that the minimum distance between
Dx, conformed by the N hyperplanes in (28), and ExΓ,k
is simply given by dxΓ,k in (29). 
Attacked
Sensors
Volume of ExΓ,∞ Distance to CriticalStates dxΓ,∞
(1) 150.72 8.07
(2) 453.51 4.20
(3) 219.43 8.60
(1,2) 952.95 -2.38
(1,3) 279.50 6.85
(2,3) 2063.46 -6.67
(1,2,3) 4300.32 -23.01
Table 1
Volume of the approximation ExΓ,∞ of RxΓ,∞ and distance
dxΓ,∞ to the critical states Cx for different attacked sensors.
Remark 4 If dxΓ,k > 0, the ellipsoid ExΓ,k boundingRxΓ,k
and the set of critical states Cx do not intersect; if dxΓ,k =
0, they touch at a point only; and dxΓ,k < 0 implies that
they intersect. In Figure 4, we depict a schematic repre-
sentation of these ideas. Note that, due to potential con-
servatism of the ellipsoidal bounds, dxΓ,k < 0 does not
necessarily imply that RxΓ,k and Cx intersect (see Figure
4 (d)). However, dxΓ,k ≥ 0 does imply that they do not
intersect, which is advantageous from the security per-
spective. Then, if we secure sensors leading to dxΓ,k < 0
or redesign controllers and monitors such that dxΓ,k ≥ 0,
we ensure that RxΓ,k and Cx does not intersect.
4.3 Simulation Results
Consider the closed-loop system (18) with matrices as
in (30), η¯ =
√
pi, and v¯ = 1. The controller matrices
(Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc) are designed to guarantee that the L2-
gain [40] from the vector of perturbations (vTk , η
T
k )
T to
the performance output sk = 0.25x
p,3
k + η
3
k is upper
bounded by γ = 3. We use the results in the appendix
to design the monitor matrix Π so that, for k > k∗ = 10,
rkΠrk ≤ 1. Using Theorem 1, we obtain EζΓ,k for all
the possible combinations of the sensor attack selec-
tion matrix Γ. Once we have EζΓ,k, using Corollary 2,
we project EζΓ,k onto the xp-hyperplane to obtain ExΓ,k.
Note that we have k-dependent approximations ExΓ,k of
RxΓ,k; however, because a < 1, the function αxk conform-
ing ExΓ,k converge exponentially to (3 − a)/(1 − a). It
follows that, in a few time steps, ExΓ,k ≈ ExΓ,∞ = {x ∈
Rn|xTPxΓx ≤ (3 − a)/(1 − a)}, and thus, ExΓ,k ≈ ExΓ,∞.
We present ExΓ,∞ instead of the time-dependent ExΓ,k.
In Figure 5, we show the projection of ExΓ,∞ onto the
(xp,2, xp,3)-hyperplane for different sets of sensor being
attacked. Figure 6 depicts the projection of ExΓ,∞ onto
the (xp,1, xp,2)-hyperplane and the distance to the set of
critical states Cx = {xp ∈ R3|xp,1 ≤ −15}. In Table 1,
we give the numerical values of the volume of ExΓ,∞ and
the distance to the critical states depicted in Figure 6
for different sensors being attacked. Note that some dis-
tances are negative, as explained in Remark 4, negative
distances imply that there is a nonempty intersection be-
tween the critical states and the stealthy reachable set.
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Fig. 4. (a) Stealthy reachable set RxΓ,k and ellipsoidal outer approximation ExΓ,k of RxΓ,k; and (b)-(d) minimum distance dxΓ,k
between ExΓ,k and critical states Cx.
Fig. 5. Projection of ExΓ,∞ onto the (xp,2, xp,3)-hyperplane
for different sets of sensor being attacked.
That is, there exist attack sequences that can drive the
system to the unsafe region without being detected by
the system monitor. Assume, for instance, that two out
of the three sensors can be completely secured, i.e., at-
tacks to these sensors are impossible. From Table 1, we
note that attacks to sensor two leads to the largest vol-
ume of ExΓ,∞ and the smallest distance to critical states
dxΓ,∞. Therefore, if only two sensors can be secured, they
should be sensors two and three. Following the same
logic, if only one sensor can be secured, then sensor two
must be selected because attacks to the remaining sen-
sors, one and three, lead to the smallest ExΓ,∞ and the
largest dxΓ,∞. Thereby, our tools can be used to allocate
security equipment to sensors when limited resources are
available.
5 Synthesis Tools: Attacker’s Reachable Sets
Next, we derive tools for designing the monitor and con-
troller matrices κ := (L,Π, Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc) such that the
Fig. 6. Projection of ExΓ,∞ onto the (xp,1, xp,2)-hyperplane
for different sets of sensor being attacked and distance to
critical states.
impact of stealthy attacks on the system dynamics is
minimized. In particular, we design κ to minimize the
volume of ExΓ,k (thus decreasing the size of RxΓ,k) while
guaranteeing some attack-free prescribed performance
of the closed-loop system.
Remark 5 We present synthesis results in terms of the
sensor attack selection matrix Γ. That is, for given Γ,
we provide synthesis tools to design optimal controllers
and monitors – optimal in terms of minimal volume ExΓ,∞
for a desired attack-free closed-loop system performance.
Note, however, that we do not have access to Γ in prac-
tice, i.e., because we assume stealthy attacks, the set of
sensors being attacked is unknown to the system designer.
Nevertheless, once we have derived synthesis results for
given Γ, we provide general guidelines for using these
results to synthesize controllers/monitors for unknown
matrix Γ. In particular, we propose techniques from sen-
sor protection placement in power systems [10,18]; and
game-theoretic techniques [4].
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
(
Ap Bp
Cp Dp
)
=

0.62 0.21 0.03 0.07 1.0
0.08 0.72 0.54 0.23 0.5
0.02 0.02 0.65 0 1.0
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
 ,
(
Ac Bc
Cc Dc
)
=

0.10 0.09 −0.16 −0.24 0.10 0.24
−0.06 −0.06 0.09 0.06 −0.06 −0.06
−0.08 −0.07 0.08 0.12 −0.07 −0.15
−0.08 1.38 0.85 −0.51 −1.74 0.01
0.09 −0.08 0.12 −0.14 −0.09 −0.27
 ,
L =
0.52 0.21 0.030.08 0.52 0.54
0.02 0.02 0.35
 ,Π =
 9.50 −0.76 −0.05−0.76 7.69 −0.95
−0.05 −0.95 8.14
× 10−2, E = In, F = Im.
(30)
Consider the extended attacker’s reachable set RζΓ,k de-
fined in (27) with matrices (A,B) as in (25). Note that,
for every realization of κ = (L,Π, Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc), us-
ing Theorem 1 and Corollary 2, we can obtain ExΓ,k con-
taining RxΓ,k. Here, we aim at finding the κ = κ∗ lead-
ing to the smallest possible volume of ExΓ,∞ (see (7))
among all realizations of (L,Π, Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc). If we
let κ be optimization variables rather than given pa-
rameters, by Proposition 1, to find κ∗, we have to find
(L,Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc) conforming the matrices (A,B), the
constants (a1, a2, b), and the matrices P and Π solution
of the optimization problem:
min
κ,P,a1,a2,b
− log det[P],
s.t. a1, a2, b ∈ (0, 1), a1 + a2 + b ≥ a, P > 0, and
L :=
aP ATP 0PA P PB
0 BTP Wai
 ≥ 0;
(31)
with Wai := diag[
1−a1
η¯ Im,
1−a2
v¯ In, (1 − b)Π]. However,
because (L,Π, Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc) are now variables, the
blocks PA, PB, and bΠ in (31) are nonlinear in (κ,P).
Following the results in [34], we propose an invertible
linearizing change of variables:
(P, κ)→ ν := ((X,Y, S), (R,G), (K,O,M,N)) , (32)
such that, in the new variables ν, the objective in (31)
is convex and the restrictions are affine. In particular,
for P > 0 and the nonlinear matrix inequality L ≥ 0
defined in (31), we aim at finding two invertible matri-
ces T1 and T2 such that the congruence transformations
P → T T1 PT1 and L → T T2 LT2 lead to new linear matrix
inequalities T T1 PT1 > 0 and T T2 LT2 ≥ 0 in ν.
5.1 Change of Variables, Constraints, and Objective
Function
To address the synthesis problem, we impose some struc-
ture on the matrix P. Let P be positive definite and of
the form
P :=
X U 0UT X˜ 0
0 0 S
 , (33)
with X,U, X˜, S ∈ Rn×n and positive definite X, X˜, and
S. Define the matrices:
X :=
[
X U
UT X˜
]
,X−1 =:
[
Y V
V T Y˜
]
,Y :=
[
Y I
V T0
]
,Z :=
[
I 0
XU
]
.
(34)
Using block matrix inversion formulas, it is easy to verify
that Y X + V UT = I and Y U + V X˜ = 0, which leads
to YTX = Z. Define the matrices T1 ∈ R3n×3n and
T2 ∈ R9n×9n as
T1 :=
[Y 0
0 I
]
=
Y I 0V T 0 0
0 0 I
 , (35)
T2 :=
[T1 0 0
0 T1 0
0 0 I
]
. (36)
Then, P → T T1 PT1 and L → T T2 LT2 take the form:
T T1 PT1 =
[
Y I 0
I X 0
0 0 S
]
=: P(ν), (37)
T T2 LT2 =
aT
T
1 PT1 T T1 ATPT1 0
T T1 PAT1 T T1 PT1 T T1 PB
0 BTPT1 Wai
 . (38)
The structure of P(ν) follows from symmetry ofP, which
implies symmetric X and Y and XY + UV T = I. Note
that the block T T1 PT1 is linear in X, Y , and S. Next,
using the definition of (A,B) in (25), we expand the
blocks T T1 PAT1 and T T1 PB. Note that the matrix A is
upper triangular. Let A be partitioned as
A =:
[A1 A2
0 A3
]
; (39)
and define the change of controller, observer, and mon-
itor variables:(
K −XApY O
M N
)
:=
(
U XBp
0 Il
)(
Ac Bc
Cc Dc
)
×
(
V T 0
CpY Im
)
, (40a)
R := SL, (40b)
G := Π. (40c)
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Then, T T1 PAT1 can be written as
A(ν) := T T1 PAT1 =
[YTXA1Y ZA2
0 SA3
]
(41)
=
ApY +BpM Ap +BpNCp −BpNΓΓ+CpK XAp +OCp −OΓΓ+Cp
0 0 SAp −R(Im − ΓΓ+)Cp
 ,
the block T T1 PB as
B(ν) := T T1 PB =
[Z 0
0 S
]
B (42)
=
BpN(Im − ΓΓ+)F E BpNΓΓ+O(Im − ΓΓ+)F XE OΓΓ+
−R(Im − ΓΓ+)F SE −RΓΓ+
 ,
and the block Wai as
Wai = diag
[
1− a1
η¯
Im,
1− a2
v¯
In, (1− b)G
]
=: W(ν).
(43)
Therefore, under T1, T2, and the new variables in (40),
the blocks transforms as{P → P(ν), T T1 PAT1 → A(ν),
T T1 PB → B(ν), Wai →W(ν),
(44)
with P(ν),A(ν), B(ν), and W(ν) as defined in (37),
(41), (42), and (43), respectively. That is, the original
blocks, PA and PB, that depend non-linearly on the
decision variables (κ,P) are transformed into blocks that
are affine functions of the new variables ν. If ν is given
and U and V are invertible, the change of variables in
(40) and the matrix T1 are invertible and thus (κ,P) can
be constructed from ν and they are unique. Moreover,
invertible V implies that T1 and T2 are nonsingular and
thus the transformations P → T T1 PT1 and L → T T2 LT2
are congruent. The latter implies that
P > 0 and L ≥ 0⇔ P(ν) > 0 and L(ν) ≥ 0, (45)
where
L(ν) := T T2 LT2 =
aP(ν) A(ν)T 0A(ν) P(ν) B(ν)
0 B(ν)T W(ν)
 . (46)
If the matrix P(ν) is positive definite, by the Schur
complement, Y > 0 and X − Y −1 > 0, and because
Y X + V UT = I by construction (see Eq. (34)), V UT =
I−Y X < 0, i.e., the matrix V UT is nonsingular. There-
fore, if P(ν) > 0, it is always possible to find nonsingu-
lar U and V satisfying Y X +V UT = I. In the following
lemma, we summarize the discussion presented above.
Lemma 2 Consider the observer, monitor, and con-
troller matrices κ = (L,Π, Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc), and the ma-
trices L and P as defined in (31) and (33), respectively.
If there exists ν = (X,Y, S,R,G,K,O,M,N) satisfying
P(ν) > 0 and L(ν) ≥ 0 with P(ν) and L(ν) as defined
in (37) and (46), respectively; then, there exists (κ,P)
satisfying P > 0 and L ≥ 0. Moreover, for every ν such
that P(ν) > 0 and L(ν) ≥ 0, the change of variables in
(40) and matrix T1 are invertible and the (κ,P) obtained
by inverting (37) and (40) is unique.
Proof: Assume that ν is such that P(ν) > 0 and
L(ν) ≥ 0. Because P(ν) > 0, by the Schur complement,
Y > 0 and X − Y −1 > 0. Since Y X + V UT = I, then
V UT = I − Y X < 0, i.e., the matrix V UT is invert-
ible. Hence, it is always possible to factorize I − Y X
as V UT = I − Y X with square and nonsingular U
and V . Invertible U and V implies that T1 and T2 are
square and nonsingular and thus the transformations
P → T T1 PT1 = P(ν) and L → T T2 LT2 = L(ν) are
congruent. It follows that P(ν) > 0 and L(ν) ≥ 0 imply
P > 0 and L ≥ 0 because P(ν) and L(ν) have the same
signature as P and L, respectively. Because P(ν) > 0,
the matrices U , V , and S are nonsingular. This implies
that the change of variables in (40) and T1 are invertible
and lead to unique (κ,P) by inverting (37) and (40). 
So far, we have derived from the analysis inequalities,
P > 0 and L ≥ 0 in (31), the synthesis inequalities
P(ν) > 0 and L(ν) ≥ 0 defined in (37) and (46). If we
find a realization of ν satisfying the synthesis inequali-
ties, we factorize I − Y X into nonsingular matrices V
and U satisfying I − Y X = V UT , use these V and U
to solve the equations in (40) to obtain the controller,
observer, and monitor matrices, and invert (37) to ob-
tain the ellipsoid matrix P. By Lemma 2, this (κ,P)
satisfies the analysis inequalities in (31).
We aim at minimizing the number of states that the at-
tacker can induce in the system while remaining stealthy,
i.e., we want to make the “size” of RxΓ,k defined in (21)
as small as possible by selecting ν. To achieve this, we
seek for the ν that minimizes the volume of ExΓ,∞ (which
would decrease the size of RxΓ,k). In the analysis case,
we look for the matrix P satisfying P > 0 and L ≥ 0
leading to the ellipsoid EζΓ,k = {ζ ∈ R3n|ζTPζ ≤ αζk}
bounding RζΓ,k (defined in (27)) and then, using Corol-
lary 2, we project this EζΓ,k onto the xp-hyperplane to
obtain ExΓ,k. To follow the same approach for synthesis,
we would need to minimize the volume of ζTPζ = αζ∞
subject to P(ν) > 0 and L(ν) ≥ 0. However, the matrix
P cannot be written in terms of ν and minimizing the
volume of ζTP(ν)ζ = αζ∞ is not an equivalent objective.
Instead, because the projection ExΓ,k can be written in
terms of ν, we seek to minimize the volume of ExΓ,∞
directly.
Lemma 3 Consider EζΓ,k = {ζ ∈ R3n|ζTPζ = αζk} with
matrix P ∈ R3n×3n as defined in (33), extended state
ζ = ((xp)T , (xc)T , eT )T , and αζk ∈ R>0, k ∈ N. The pro-
jection of EζΓ,k onto the xp-hyperplane is given by the el-
lipsoid ExΓ,k = {xp ∈ Rn|(xp)TY −1xp = αζk} with Y as
defined in (34).
Proof: For P as defined in (33), by Lemma 10 in the ap-
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pendix, the boundary of the projection of EζΓ,k onto the xp-
hyperplane, ExΓ,k, is given by (xp)T (X − UX˜−1UT )xp =
αζk. Using standard block matrix inversion formulas (see,
e.g., [15]) and the definition of Y in (34), we have Y =
(X − UX˜−1UT )−1 and therefore ExΓ,k can be written in
terms of ν as ExΓ,k = {xp ∈ Rn|(xp)TY −1xp = αζk}. 
Lemma 3 implies that, in the new variables, we can min-
imize the volume of (xp)TY −1xp = αζ∞ to reduce the
size of RxΓ,k. Therefore, in the synthesis case, we seek to
minimize the volume of (xp)TY −1xp = αζ∞ subject to
P(ν) > 0 and L(ν) ≥ 0. The volume of ExΓ,∞ is pro-
portional to
√
det[Y ] for any αζ∞ > 0 [19]. Moreover,
the function
√
det[Y ] shares the same minimizer with
log det[Y ] [5]. However, the function log det[Y ] is con-
cave for any positive definite matrix Y . To overcome this
obstacle, we look for a convex upper bound on
√
det[Y ]
and minimize this bound instead. In order to derive this
bound, we use the Arithmetic Mean-Geometric Mean
(AM-GM) Inequality which states the following: For any
sequence of positive real numbers, c1, c2, . . . , cn, the in-
equality (
∏n
j=1 cj)
1/n ≤ 1n
∑n
j=1 cj is satisfied [36].
Lemma 4 For any positive definite matrix Y ∈ Rn×n,
the following is satisfied:
det[Y ]
1
n ≤ 1
n
trace[Y ]⇒ det[Y ] 12 ≤ 1
n
n
2
trace[Y ]
n
2 .
(47)
Moreover, because Y is positive definite
arg min[trace[Y ]n/2] = arg min[trace[Y ]];
that is, trace[Y ]n/2 and trace[Y ] share the same mini-
mizer. Therefore, by minimizing trace[Y ], we minimize
an upper bound on
√
det[Y ].
Proof: Let λj [Y ] denote the j-th eigenvalue of Y ,
j = 1, . . . , n. Because Y is positive definite, the
eigenvalues of Y are strictly positive. Then, because
det[Y ] =
∏n
j=1 λj [Y ] and trace[Y ] =
∑n
j=1 λj [Y ], we
have (
∏n
j=1 λj [Y ])
1/n ≤ 1n
∑n
j=1 λj [Y ] as a direct con-
sequence of the (AM-GM) inequality [36], i.e., the left-
hand side of (47) is satisfied for any positive definite Y .
Given that both det[Y ] and trace[Y ] are strictly positive,
the right-hand side of (47) follows from the left-hand side
inequality by raising it to the power n/2. The function
g(x) := xn/2 is strictly positive and convex for x > 0.
Hence, the upper bound (1/nn/2)trace[Y ]n/2 in (47) is
monotonically increasing in trace[Y ]. It follows that, for
Y > 0, arg min[trace[Y ]n/2] = arg min[trace[Y ]] for any
n ∈ N, and the assertion follows. 
Up to this point, we have the necessary tools for select-
ing ν to reduce the size of the stealthy reachable set
RxΓ,k. That is, we have the constraints, P(ν) > 0 and
L(ν) ≥ 0, and the cost function, trace[Y ], needed to
cast the optimization problem to minimize the volume
of ExΓ,∞. There is, however, one last ingredient to be
considered before casting the complete synthesis opti-
mization problem; namely, the attack-free performance
of the closed-loop dynamics.
5.2 Attack-Free Observer, Monitor, and Controller
Performance
As we now move towards posing the complete synthe-
ses optimization problem, we note that as ||L|| → 0,
||Bc|| → 0, and ||Dc|| → 0, the reachable set RxΓ,k con-
verges to the empty set because the attack-dependent
terms in (18) vanish. To make this concrete, without
any other considered criteria, the matrices (L,Ac, Bc)
leading to the smallest ExΓ,k are trivially given by
(L,Ac, Bc) = 0. While this is effective at eliminating
the impact of the attacker, it implies that we discard
the observer and the controller altogether and, there-
fore, forfeit any ability to control the system and build
a reliable estimate of the state. If there are performance
specifications that the observer, monitor, and controller
must satisfy in the attack-free case (e.g., convergence
speed, perturbation-output gain, and closed-loop dy-
namics spectrum), they have to be added as extra
constraints into the minimization problem posted to
minimize the volume of ExΓ,∞.
Several time and frequency domain performance spec-
ifications for LTI systems have been expressed as LMI
constraints on the closed-loop state-space matrices and
quadratic Lyapunov functions [34]. Here, our goal is
to compute a single observer (12), monitor (16), and
controller (17) that: 1) meets the required attack-free
performance specifications, and 2) decreases the set of
states reachable by stealthy attackers. For LTI systems
and some of the most frequently used performance spec-
ifications (e.g., general quadratic performance [34]),
there are analysis and synthesis results of the form: Sys-
tem Σ satisfies the performance specification γj if there
exists a Lyapunov matrix Pj that satisfies some LMIs in
Pj . If our synthesis problem involves N specifications,
γ1, . . . , γN , by collecting the LMIs of each specification,
we end up having a set of matrix inequalities whose
variables are the observer, monitor, and controller ma-
trices, and the Lyapunov matrices, P1, . . . ,PN , of the
specifications (plus auxiliary variables depending on
the performance criteria). To pose a tractable co-design
considering the volume of ExΓ,k and the specification
γj , we must rewrite the specification Lyapunov matrix
Pj and its corresponding LMIs in terms of the syn-
thesis variables ν. This can be achieved by imposing
Pj = TTj PTj , where P is the Lyapunov-like matrix as-
sociated with ExΓ,k in (33) and Tj denotes some linear
transformation. By doing so, we can write the specifica-
tion LMIs in terms of P and use the change of variables
in (40) and the transformations T1 and T2 in (35)-(36)
to write these LMIs in terms of ν.
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Remark 6 In this manuscript, as attack-free perfor-
mance specifications, we consider the spectrum of the
estimation error dynamics for the observer and, for the
controller, the L2 gain from the vector of perturbations
to some performance output. We remark that any other
specification γj can be considered in our framework as
long as the corresponding Lyapunov matrix Pj and the
LMIs can be written in terms of the synthesis variables
ν. In Ref. [34], the authors provide a synthesis frame-
work for general quadratic performance – which covers
H2/H∞ performance, passivity, asymptotic disturbance
rejection, peak impulse response, peak-to-peak gain,
nominal/robust regulation, and closed-loop pole location.
The framework here and the one in [34] are compatible in
the sense that any performance specification considered
in [34] can be written as LMIs in terms of our syntheses
variables ν.
Attack-Free Monitor Feasibility. Note that the ob-
server gain L and the monitor matrix Π must be chosen
such that Assumption 1 is satisfied. That is, the pair
(L,Π) must be selected such that, in the attack-free case
(δk = 0), there exists some k
∗ ∈ N satisfying rTk Πrk ≤ 1
for all k ≥ k∗ and rk solution of (15). Next, we provide
constraints in the syntheses variables ν that have to be
fulfilled to satisfy Assumption 1.
Lemma 5 Consider the system matrices (Ap, Cp, E, F )
and the perturbation bounds v¯, η¯ ∈ R>0. Assume no at-
tacks to the system, i.e., δk = 0. For a given a ∈ (0, 1),
constant αe∞ := (2 − a)/(1 − a), and  ∈ R>0, if there
exist constants a1, a2 ∈ R and matrices S ∈ Rn×n,
G ∈ Rm×m, and R ∈ Rn×m satisfying:
a1, a2 ∈ (0, 1), a1 + a2 ≥ a, S > 0, G > 0,
aS (SAp −RCp)T 0 0
SAp −RCp S −RF SE
0 −(RF )T 1−a1
η¯
Im 0
0 ETS 0 1−a2
v¯
In
 ≥ 0,
[ 1
αe∞++η¯
S − (Cp)TGCp −(Cp)TG
−GCp 1
αe∞++η¯
Im −G
]
≥ 0;
(48)
then, for L = S−1R and Π = G, the residual dynamics
(15) satisfies rTk Πrk ≤ 1 for all k ≥ k∗(a, , e1, S), where
k∗(a, , e1, S) := min{k ∈ N|ak−1
(
eT1 Se1 − αe∞
) ≤ }
and e1 denotes the initial estimation error in (15).
The proof of Lemma 5 is given in the appendix. The
constant  determines the tightness of the monitor, i.e.,
the smaller the  the tighter the bound rTk Πrk ≤ 1 for
k ≥ k∗. Note, however, that depending on the initial
condition e1, too small  might result in very large
k∗ = min{k ∈ N|ak−1(eT1 Se1 − αe∞) ≤ }. See Remark
10 in the appendix for further details.
Attack-Free Observer Performance. For the ob-
server, we simply consider the speed of convergence of
the estimation error to steady state as a performance
criteria. This is quantified by the eigenvalues of the ma-
trix (Ap − LCp). We restrict the values that L might
take by enforcing that the eigenvalues of (Ap−LCp) are
contained in a disk, Disk[β, τ ], centered at β + 0i with
radius τ . We give a necessary and sufficient condition
in terms of the synthesis variables, R and S, to achieve
this performance.
Lemma 6 [Observer Performance][11] Consider the
system matrices (Ap, Cp). If there exist S ∈ Rn×n and
R ∈ Rn×m satisfying:
S > 0,[
S βS − SAp +RCp(
αS − SAp +RCp)T τ2S
]
≥ 0;
(49)
then, the eigenvalues of (Ap − LCp) with L = S−1R are
contained in the closed disk Disk[β, τ ] centered at β + 0i
with radius τ .
Attack-Free Controller Performance. For the con-
troller, we consider the L2 gain of the closed-loop sys-
tem from the vector of perturbations, dk := (η
T
k , v
T
k )
T ∈
Rm+n, to some performance output, say sk ∈ Rg, in the
attack-free case (i.e., δk = 0). Define the matrices
A˜ :=
[
Ap +BpDcCp BpCc
BcCp Ac
]
, B˜ :=
[
BpDcF E
BcF 0
]
,
(50)
and the performance output sk := C
sxpk+D
suk+D1ηk+
D2vk, for some matrices C
s ∈ Rg×n, Ds ∈ Rg×l, D1 ∈
Rg×m, and D2 ∈ Rg×n. Then, the closed-loop dynamics
(11),(17) can be written in terms of the extended state
ζ˜k := ((x
p
k)
T , (xck)
T )T ∈ R2n, the vector of perturba-
tions dk, and the performance output sk:{
ζ˜k+1 = A˜ζ˜k + B˜dk,
sk = C˜ζ˜k + D˜dk,
(51)
with C˜ := (Cs + DsDcCp, DsCc) and D˜ := (D1 +
DsDcF, D2). The L2 gain from dk to sk of system (51) is
given by supdk∈L2,dk 6=0(‖sk‖2 / ‖dk‖2) for ζ˜1 = 0, where,
for any sequence ρk ∈ Rnρ , ‖ρk‖2 :=
∑∞
k=1(ρ
T
k ρk)
1
2 .
The L2 gain of system (51) equals the H∞ norm of the
transfer matrix H(s) := D˜ + C˜(sI − A˜)−1B˜, see [35].
Lemma 7 [Bounded-Real Lemma] Consider the closed-
loop system (51) with input dk and output sk. If there
exist X ∈ R2n×2n and γ ∈ R>0 satisfying:
X > 0, S :=

X A˜TX 0 C˜T
XA˜ X XB˜ 0
0 B˜TX γ2I D˜T
C˜ 0 D˜ I
 ≥ 0; (52)
then, the L2 gain of system (51) is less than or equal
to γ, i.e., supdk∈L2,dk 6=0(‖sk‖2 / ‖dk‖2) ≤ γ for ζ˜1 = 0.
The proof of Lemma 7 is omitted here. It is a standard
result and details about the proof can be found in, for
instance, [5], [35], and references therein.
Using the analysis inequalities in (52), we derive the
corresponding synthesis constraints in terms of the syn-
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thesis variables ν. Consider the matrices X and Y in-
troduced in (34), the change of variables in (40a), and
the attack-free closed-loop system matrices (A˜, B˜, C˜, D˜)
above defined. Define the matrices:
X˜(ν) := YTXY =
[
Y I
I X
]
,
A˜(ν) := YTXA˜Y =
[
ApY +BpM Ap +BpNCp
K XAp +OCp
]
,
B˜(ν) := YTXB˜ =
[
BpNF E
OF XE
]
,
C˜(ν) := C˜Y = [CsY +DsM Cs +DsNCp] ,
D˜(ν) := D˜ = [D1 +DsNF D2] .
(53)
Lemma 8 [H∞-Performance] Consider the system
matrices (Ap, Bp, Cp, E, F ). If there exist O ∈ Rn×l,
X,Y,K ∈ Rn×n, M ∈ Rm×n, and N ∈ Rl×m, and
constant γ ∈ R>0 satisfying:
X˜(ν) > 0, S(ν) :=

X˜(ν) A˜(ν)T 0 C˜(ν)T
A˜(ν) X˜(ν) B˜(ν) 0
0 B˜(ν)T γ2I D˜(ν)T
C˜(ν) 0 D˜(ν) I
 ≥ 0;
(54)
then, the change of variables in (40a) and the matrix Y in
(34) are invertible and the matrices (X , Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc)
obtained by inverting (40a) and X˜(ν) = YTXY in (53)
satisfy (52) and lead to sup
dk∈L2,dk 6=0
‖sk‖2
‖dk‖2 ≤ γ for ζ˜1 = 0.
The proof of Lemma 8 is given in the appendix.
5.3 Synthesis of Secure Control Systems
Finally, combining the results above presented, we cast
the complete optimization problem to minimize the vol-
ume of the asymptotic approximation ExΓ,∞ of RxΓ,k as a
function of the set of sensor being attacked (the sensor
selection matrix Γ) while guaranteing certain attack-free
system performance.
Theorem 2 Consider (Ap, Bp, Cp, E, F ) (the sys-
tem matrices), the perturbations bounds v¯, η¯ ∈ R>0,
and the attack sensor selection matrix Γ. For given
a, b ∈ (0, 1), αe∞ = (2−a)/(1−a),  ∈ R>0, τ, β ∈ (0, 1),
γ ∈ R>0, if there exist a1, a2 ∈ R and matrices
ν = (X,Y, S,R,G,K,O,M,N), X,Y, S,K ∈ Rn×n,
R ∈ Rn×m, G ∈ Rm×m, O ∈ Rn×l, M ∈ Rm×n,
N ∈ Rl×m, solution of the convex optimization:
min
ν,a1,a2
trace[Y ], (55a)
s.t. a1, a2 ∈ (0, 1), a1 + a2 + b ≥ a,
P(ν) > 0, L(ν) ≥ 0, (attacker’s reachable set),
(48), (monitor feasibility),
(49), (observer performance),
X˜(ν) > 0, S(ν) ≥ 0, (controller performance),
(55b)
with P(ν),L(ν), X˜(ν), and S(ν) as defined in (37), (46),
(53), and (54), respectively; then, the transformation T1
in (35) and the change of variables in (40) are invert-
ible and the matrices (P, L,Π, Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc) obtained
by inverting (40) and T T1 PT1 = P(ν) in (37) lead to:
1) a feasible monitor in the sense of Lemma 5; 2) for
k ≥ k∗(a, , e1, S) = min{k ∈ N|ak−1
(
eT1 Se1−αe∞
) ≤ }
and initial estimation error e1 in (15), RxΓ,k ⊆ ExΓ,k
with ExΓ,k = {xp ∈ R3n|(xp)TPxΓxp ≤ αζk}, PxΓ :=
X−UX˜−1UT , and αζk := ak−1ζTk∗Pζk∗+ 3−a1−a (1−ak−1);
3) the eigenvalues of (Ap − LCp) being contained in
Disk[β, τ ]; and 4) supdk∈L2,dk 6=0(‖sk‖2 / ‖dk‖2) ≤ γ for
ζ˜1 = 0. Moreover, by minimizing trace[Y ], we are mini-
mizing an upper bound on the volume of ExΓ,∞.
Proof: Assume that (ν, a1, a2) satisfy the constraints
in (55). By Lemma 2, because P(ν) > 0 and L(ν) ≥ 0,
the transformation T1 in (35) and the change of variables
in (40) are invertible, and the (P, L,Π, Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc)
obtained by inverting (40) and T T1 PT1 = P(ν) in
(37) satisfy the analysis inequalities P > 0 and
L ≥ 0 defined in (31) and (33), respectively, and
are unique. Moreover, by assumption, (48) is fulfilled.
Then, by Lemma 5, the residual dynamics (15) satisfies
rTk Πrk ≤ 1 for all k ≥ k∗(a, , e1, S), and Π = G and
L = S−1R. Therefore, by Lemma 2, Lemma 3, and
Lemma 5, RxΓ,k ⊆ ExΓ,k with PxΓ = X − UX˜−1UT and
αζk = a
k−1ζTk∗Pζk∗+ 3−a1−a (1−ak−1). Because we are min-
imizing trace[Y ] and Y = (X−UX˜−1UT )−1, by Lemma
3 and Lemma 4, we are minimizing an upper bound on
the volume of ExΓ,∞. Next, because (49) is fulfilled by
assumption, by Lemma 6, the eigenvalues of (Ap−LCp)
with L = S−1R are contained in Disk[β, τ ]. Finally, be-
cause ν satisfy X˜(ν) > 0 and S(ν) ≥ 0 by assumption,
by Lemma 8, the controller obtained by inverting (40a)
leads to supdk∈L2,dk 6=0(‖sk‖2 / ‖dk‖2) ≤ γ. 
Observer, Monitor, Controller, and Ellipsoidal-
Approximation Reconstruction. Given a solution
(ν, a1, a2) of the optimization problem in (55):
(1) For given X and Y , compute via singular value de-
composition a full rank factorization V UT = I − Y X
with square and nonsingular V and U .
(2) For given ν and invertible V and U , solve the sys-
tem of equations T T1 PT1 = P(ν) and (40) to obtain the
matrices (P, L,Π, Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc).
(3) For given S, Y , P, e1, , and a, obtain the mon-
itor convergence time k∗, and PxΓ and αζk conform-
ing the ellipsoidal approximation ExΓ,k of RxΓ,k as:
k∗ = min{k ∈ N|ak−1(eT1 Se1 − αe∞), PxΓ = Y −1, and
αζk = a
k−1ζTk∗Pζk∗ + 3−a1−a (1− ak−1).
By Theorem 2, the reconstructed matrices satisfy the
attack-free system performance, and minimize an upper
bound on the volume of ExΓ,∞.
Remark 7 To obtain tighter approximations ExΓ,k of
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RxΓ,k, once the matrices (L,Π, Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc) are com-
puted using Theorem 2 and the above reconstruction
procedure, we can close the loop using these matrices and
use the analysis result in Theorem 1 to obtain tighter
approximations. That is, Theorem 2 could be used for
synthesis only, and then, once (L,Π, Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc) are
computed, we could use the analysis result in Theorem 1
to obtain less conservative approximations of RxΓ,k.
Remark 8 Note that the constants a, b, , τ, β, and γ in
Theorem 2 must be fixed before solving the synthesis op-
timization problem in (55). The constants (τ, β, γ) de-
termine the attack-free observer and controller perfor-
mance. The constant  determines the tightness of the
monitor in the attack-free case. The smaller the  the
tighter the monitor (see Remark 10 in the Appendix for
details). Finally, a, b ∈ (0, 1) are, in fact, variables of
the optimization problem. However, to linearize some of
the constraints, we fix their value before solving (55) and
search over a, b ∈ (0, 1) to find the optimal ν. The lat-
ter increases the computations needed to find the optimal
ν; however, because a, b ∈ (0, 1) (a bounded set), the re-
quired grid in (a, b) is of reasonable size.
5.4 Distance to Critical States: Synthesis
As a second cost function for synthesis, we consider the
distance betweenRxΓ,k and a possible set of critical states
Cx. Because RxΓ,k is not known exactly, we consider the
distance from the approximation ExΓ,k to Cx and use this
distance as cost function. We capture the set of criti-
cal states through the union of half-spaces defined by
their boundary hyperplanes as introduced in (28). In
the analysis case, we compute the minimum distance,
dxΓ,k, between ExΓ,k and Cx and use this distance to ap-
proximate the proposed security metric (the distance
between RxΓ,k and Cx). For synthesis, however, the dis-
tance dxΓ,k is highly nonlinear and not convex/concave
in the syntheses variables ν. Instead, we consider the
minimum distance between each hyperplane conform-
ing Cx and the asymptotic ellipsoidal approximation,
ExΓ,∞ = limk→∞ ExΓ,k, and use the weighted sum of these
distances as the cost function to be maximized.
Proposition 2 Consider the ellipsoidal approximation
ExΓ,k as introduced in Lemma 3 with matrix Y and func-
tion αζk, and the set of critical states:
Cx =
{
xp ∈ Rn
∣∣∣∣∣
N⋃
i=1
cTi x
p ≥ bi
}
,
where each pair (ci, bi), ci ∈ Rn, bi ∈ R, i = 1, . . . , N
quantifies a hyperplane that defines a single half-space.
The minimum distance dx,iΓ,k between ExΓ,k and the hyper-
plane cTi x
p = bi is given by d
x,i
Γ,k :=
|bi|−
√
cT
i
Y ci/α
ζ
k
cT
i
ci
.
Proof: The assertion follows by the same arguments as
in the proof of Corollary 3. 
For synthesis, we aim at maximizing
∑N
i=1 ρid
x,i
Γ,k, for
some ρi ∈ R≥0 satisfying
∑N
i=1 ρi = 1, by selecting
(ν, a1, a2) subject to (55b). The constant ρi assigns a
priority weight to the distance dx,iΓ,k. Note, however, that
because αζk = a
k−1ζTk∗Pζk∗ + 3−a1−a (1− ak−1) and
P−1 = diag
[(
Y V
V T Y˜
)
, S−1
]
,
the term cTi Y ci/α
ζ
k is nonlinear and not convex/concave
in the matrix Y . However, because a ∈ (0, 1), we can
maximize the weighted sum of the asymptotic minimum
distances between ExΓ,k and cTi xp = bi, i = 1, . . . , N ,
i.e., d˜Γ := limk→∞
∑N
i=1 ρid
x,i
Γ,k =
∑N
i=1 ρi
(|bi| −
( 1−a3−ac
T
i Y ci)
−1/2)/cTi ci. Because (1 − a)/(3 − a) is
strictly positive and Y is positive definite, maximiz-
ing d˜Γ is equivalent to minimizing the linear function:∑N
i=1 ρi(c
T
i Y ci). Next, as a corollary of Theorem 2, we
pose the optimization problem required to maximize
d˜Γ while guaranteeing the required attack-free perfor-
mance.
Corollary 4 Consider the setting stated in Theorem 2,
the set of critical states Cx defined in (28), and d˜Γ above
defined for some ρi ∈ R≥0,
∑N
i=1 ρi = 1, i = 1, . . . , N .
If there exists (ν, a1, a2) solution of the optimization:{
minν,a1,a2
∑N
i=1 ρic
T
i Y ci,
s.t. (55b),
(56)
then, the matrices (P, L,Π, Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc) obtained by
inverting (40) and T T1 PT1 = P(ν) in (37), maximize d˜Γ
and satisfy the desired attack-free system performance in
the sense of Theorem 2.
Proof: Let the constraints in (55b) be satisfied. Then,
by the same arguments as stated in the proof of The-
orem 2, the matrices (P, L,Π, Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc) obtained
by inverting (40) and T T1 PT1 = P(ν) in (37) lead to a
closed-loop dynamics that satisfies the attack-free per-
formance considered in Theorem 2. Also, by the argu-
ments above presented, minimizing
∑N
i=1 ρic
T
i Y ci and
maximizing d˜Γ are equivalent objectives. 
5.5 Controller/Monitor Selection for Unknown Γ
The synthesis results presented above are derived for
given sensor attack selection matrix Γ, see Remark 5.
However, we do not have access to Γ in practice, i.e., the
set of sensors being attacked is usually unknown to the
system designer. Next, we provide general guidelines
for using the results given above to synthesize con-
trollers/monitors when Γ is unknown. We propose two
sets of techniques: sensor protection placement methods
[10,18]; and game-theoretic techniques [4].
Sensor Protection Placement. This technique was
originally introduced for power system [10,18]. The prob-
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Fig. 7. Projection of ExΓ,∞ onto the (xp,1, xp,2)-hyperplane
for different sets of sensor being attacked and distance to
critical states. Continuous-lines correspond to the original
κ in (30) and dashed-lines to the optimal κ obtained using
Theorem 2.
lem is the following: assuming that the system designer
has limited security resources to completely encrypt and
secure a subset of sensors (i.e., attacks to those sensors
are impossible), how to select which sensors to secure in
order to minimize the effect of stealthy attacks on the
system performance. In exactly the same sense, we have
shown in the analysis example in Section 4.3 that our
analysis tools can be used to allocate security equip-
ment to sensors when limited resources are available so
that the size of the stealthy reachable set is minimized.
Now, in the syntheses setting, we address a slightly
different problem: for given m sensors and a limited
number of sensors that can be secured m˜ ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
which sensors should be selected such that the optimal
controller/monitor corresponding to attacks to all the
remaining m− m˜ sensors leads to the smallest stealthy
reachable set (or the largest distance to critical states)
among all subsets of m − m˜ sensors. For instance, as-
sume that we have three sensors, m = 3, and m˜ = 1 of
them can be secured. Then, among all subsets of sen-
sors J ⊆ {1, 2, 3} with cardinality card[J ] = m− m˜ = 2
(i.e., J ∈ {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}}), select the con-
troller/monitor κJ ∈ {κ{1,2}, κ{1,3}, κ{2,3}} that leads to
the smallest asymptotic ellipsoid ExJ := ExΓ,∞|Γ=ΓJ ,κ=κJ ,
where κJ denotes the optimal κ = (L,Π, A
c, Bc, Cc, Dc)
corresponding to the solution of (55) for Γ = ΓJ ,
and ΓJ ∈ {Γ{1,2},Γ{1,3},Γ{2,3}} is the attack selec-
tion matrix corresponding to attacks on sensors J .
That is, we compute optimal controllers/monitors and
corresponding asymptotic ellipsoids (κJ , ExJ ) for all
J ∈ {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}}, and select the controller κJ
that leads to the smallest ExJ . In the following algorithm,
we summarize the ideas introduced above.
Algorithm 1. Controller/Monitor Selection:
1) Consider the m available sensors, the number of
sensors that can be secured m˜ ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, and all
subsets of sensors J ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} with cardinality
card[J ] = m− m˜.
2) Let ΓJ denote the sensor attack selection matrix cor-
responding to attacks on sensors J . For Γ = ΓJ and all
J ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}with card[J ] = m−m˜, compute the opti-
mal controller/monitor κJ := κ = (L,Π, A
c, Bc, Cc, Dc)
corresponding to the solution of (55) in Theorem 2.
3) Let ExJ = ExΓ,∞|Γ=ΓJ ,κ=κJ , i.e., ExJ denotes the
asymptotic ellipsoidal approximation of the stealthy
reachable set, RxΓ,k, for Γ = ΓJ and κ = κJ ; and select
the controller/monitor as follows:
κ∗m˜ = arg min
κJ
Vol[ExJ ], (57)
where Vol[ExJ ] denotes the volume of ExJ .
Note that the selected controller/monitor κ∗m˜ in (57)
is parametrized by m˜, the number of sensors that can
be secured; and that in the case m˜ = 0 (no sensors
can be secured), ΓJ = Γ{1,...,m} = Im, i.e., the selected
controller/monitor κ∗0 is a worst-case controller that
assumes all sensors are attacked. We remark that Al-
gorithm 1 could be used using the largest distance to
critical states d˜Γ as cost to be maximized instead of
minimizing Vol[ExJ ].
Game-Theoretic Strategies. We only briefly in-
troduce a game-theoretic formulation and some tech-
niques that could be used to select suitable con-
trollers/monitors for unknown Γ. A rigourous game-
theoretic formulation is beyond the scope of this pa-
per and is left as future work. Note that we can
compute optimal controllers/monitors for all possi-
ble combinations of Γ. If there are m sensors, there
are m¯ :=
∑m
s=1
(
m
s
)
possible matrices Γ. We in-
dex and order all these matrices in the m¯-tuple
(Γ{1},Γ{2}, . . . ,Γ{1,2},Γ{1,3}, . . . ,Γ{1,...,m}) =: Γ¯, and
the corresponding optimal controllers/monitors κ in
(κ{1}, κ{2}, . . . , κ{1,2}, κ{1,3}, . . . , κ{1,...,m}) =: κ¯ with
card[Γ¯] = card[κ¯] = m¯, where, as introduced above,
for instance, κ{1,3} is the controller/monitor κ cor-
responding to the solution of (55) in Theorem 2 for
Γ = Γ{1,3}, and Γ{1,3} is the sensor selection matrix
Γ corresponding to attacks on sensors {1, 3}. Associ-
ated with every pair (κI ,ΓJ) ∈ κ¯ × Γ¯, we introduce
the corresponding cost hI,J := Vol[ExΓ,∞|Γ=ΓJ ,κ=κI ],
where Vol[ExΓ,∞|Γ=ΓJ ,κ=κI ] denotes the volume of ExΓ,∞
for Γ = ΓJ and κ = κI . That is, ExΓ,∞|Γ=ΓJ ,κ=κI is the
asymptotic ellipsoidal approximation of the stealthy
reachable set RxΓ,k for Γ = ΓJ and κ = κI , and κI is
the controller/monitor κ corresponding to the solution
of (55) in Theorem 2 for Γ = ΓI . Note that, by con-
struction, κI minimizes the cost hI,I but is not optimal
for hI,J , I 6= J . Next, using the notation introduced
above, we cast the controller/monitor selection as a two
players noncooperative zero-sum matrix game [4], where
player one (the defender) has strategy set κ¯, player two
(the attacker) has strategy set Γ¯, and the cost matrix
of the game is H := {hI,J} ∈ Rm¯×m¯. Define the tu-
ple K := ({1}, {2}, . . . , {1, 2}, {1, 3}, . . . , {1, . . . ,m})
indexed as K1 = {1}, K2 = {2}, Km¯ = {1, . . . ,m},
and so on. Then, elements of the game matrix H(i, j),
i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m¯}, correspond to hKi,Kj , i.e., there is a
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one-to-one correspondence between H(i, j) and hKi,Kj .
Hereafter, we only use entries H(i, j), i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m¯},
of the matrix game without making reference to the
corresponding sets (Ki,Kj); indeed, the strategy of the
defender associated with H(i, j) is κKi , and the one of
the attacker is ΓKj . If the defender chooses strategy i
(the i-th row of H) and the attacker the strategy j (the
j-th column of H), the outcome of the game is H(i, j).
Here, the defender seeks to minimize the outcome of the
game, while the attacker aims at maximizing it, both
by independent decisions. Note that this game is only
played once, the controller is selected before the system
starts operating and it is not changed during the oper-
ation. Then, a reasonable strategy for the defender is
to secure his losses against any (rational or irrational)
behavior of the attacker [4]. Under this strategy, the
defender selects the strategy i∗ ∈ {1, . . . , m¯}, the i∗-
row of H, whose largest entry is no bigger than the
largest entry of any other row. Therefore, if the defender
chooses the i∗-th row as his strategy, where i∗ satisfies
the inequalities:
f¯(H) := max
j
H(i∗, j) ≤ max
j
H(i, j); (58)
then, his looses are no greater than f¯ , which is referred
in the literature as the ceiling of the defender or the
security level for the defender’s losses [4]. The strat-
egy “row i∗” (the controller/monitor κKi∗ ) that yields
this security level is called the security strategy of the
defender. For every matrix game H, the security level
of the defender’s losses is unique, and there exists at
least one security strategy [4]. Using the security strat-
egy κKi∗ (where i
∗ satisfies (58)) as the selected con-
troller/monitor is the best rational strategy that can be
taken under the assumptions of the game (i.e., noncoop-
erative, played only once, and independent decisions).
Note that the attacker has also a security strategy that
secures his gains against any strategy of the defender.
However, whether he plays that strategy (or not) would
not chance the security strategy of the defender. Here,
we use the security strategy κKi∗ described above as the
selected controller/monitor.
An alternative formulation is to assign probabilities to
every strategy of the attacker and select the defender’s
strategy that minimizes the expected value of the game.
Define the vector of probabilities p := (p1, . . . , pm¯)
T ,
pj ≥ 0,
∑m¯
j=1 pj = 1, j ∈ {1, . . . , m¯}, where pj denotes
the probability that the attacker uses strategy j (the j-
th column ofH). These probabilities have to be assigned
by the defender given the system configuration. For in-
stance, if sensors are geographically distributed (e.g.,
in power/water networks), some of them could be com-
pletely inaccessible and some others might be easier to
reach/hack. Another option is to assign higher probabil-
ities to attacks on single sensors than on groups of them.
Simply because it might be easier to hack one sensor
than more than one. Thus, the system designer has to
assign smaller/larger probabilities to every sensor of the
system. Note that for a given defender’s strategy i, the
value of the game is H(i, 1) with probability p1, H(i, 2)
with probability p2, H(i, m¯) with probability pm¯, and so
on. Then, for this i-th row strategy, the expected value
of the game is given by H(i, ∗)p, where H(i, ∗) ∈ R1×m¯
denotes the i-th row of the game matrixH. The defender
selects the strategy i∗ ∈ {1, . . . , m¯}, the i∗-row of H,
that minimizes the expected value of the game, i.e.,
i∗ = arg min
i
H(i∗, ∗)p. (59)
We use the strategy “row i∗” (the controller/monitor
κKi∗ ) as the chosen controller/monitor. Note that this
strategy might lead to a better outcome of the game
(for the defender) with certain “optimal” probability.
However, there is also a nonzero probability of doing
worse than with the deterministic formulation presented
above. This might be a risk worth taking to improve the
security of the system. We remark that the matrix game
H could be constructed using the largest distance to
critical states d˜Γ instead of Vol[ExΓ,∞]. In that case, the
defender seeks to maximize the distance and the attacker
aims at minimizing it.
5.6 Simulation Results
Consider the system matrices (Ap, Bp, Cp, E, F ) in (30),
and the perturbation bounds η¯ =
√
pi and v¯ = 1. Let
 = 0.1 and (β, τ) = (0, 0.99), i.e., the monitor con-
stant  is fixed to 0.1 and the eigenvalues of the ob-
server closed-loop matrix (Ap−LCp) are required to be
contained in the disk centered at 0 + 0i of radius 0.80,
Disk[0, 0.80]. Consider the performance output matri-
ces Cs = (0, 0, 0.25), D
s = 01×2, D1 = (0, 0, 1), and
D2 = 01×3, and the set of critical states Cx = {xp ∈
R3|xp,1 ≤ −15}. The controller must guarantee, in the
attack-free case, that the L2-gain from the vector of
perturbations dk = (η
T
k , v
T
k )
T to sk = Csx
p
k + Dsuk +
D1ηk + D2vk = 0.25x
p,3
k + η
3
k is less than or equal to
γ = 3.0 (as the controller given in (30) for the analysis
section). We use Theorem 2 and Corollary 4 to obtain
optimal κ = (L,Π, Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc) minimizing ExΓ,∞ and
maximizing d˜Γ, respectively, for all possible combina-
tions of sensors being attacked (all the possible sensor
attack selection matrices Γ). Once we have these κ, we
use the analysis results in Theorem 1 and Corollary 2
to obtain tighter approximations ExΓ,k of RxΓ,k; and use
these ExΓ,k to obtain tighter d˜Γ. As in the analysis case,
we have k-dependent approximations ExΓ,k; however, be-
cause a < 1, the function αxk conforming ExΓ,k converge
exponentially to (3 − a)/(1 − a). Hence, in a few time
steps, ExΓ,k ≈ ExΓ,∞ = {x ∈ Rn|xTPxΓx ≤ (3−a)/(1−a)},
and thus, ExΓ,k ≈ ExΓ,∞. We present ExΓ,∞ instead of the
time-dependent ExΓ,k. In Table 2, we present the volume
of the asymptotic approximation ExΓ,∞ and the distance
d˜Γ between ExΓ,∞ and the critical states Cx for all possi-
ble combinations of sensors being attacked. We show re-
sults for the original κ in (30); and for the optimal κ ob-
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tained using Theorem 2 and Corollary 4. Note that the
improvement is remarkable using the optimal κ. To illus-
trate this improvement, in Figure 7, we show the projec-
tion of ExΓ,∞ onto the (xp,1, xp,2)-hyperplane for sensors
{2},{2,3}, and {1,2,3} being attacked. We depict the pro-
jections for both the original κ in (30) and the optimal
one (minimizing trace[Y ]). For sensor {2}, we have a 67%
improvement in volume and 142% in distance; for {2,3},
88% and 247%; and for {1,2,3}, 67% and 92%, respec-
tively. Once we have all the optimal controllers/monitors
and the corresponding costs in Table 2, we can use Al-
gorithm 1 in Section 5.5 (the sensor protection place-
ment method) to select the best κ given a number of
sensors that can be completely secured m˜. If m˜ = 1;
then, according to Algorithm 1, sensor two should be
the one to be secured because κ = κ1,3 (the optimal
controller/monitor assuming sensors {1, 3} are attacked)
leads to the smallest volume (137.44), see Table 2. On the
other hand, if distance to critical states is more impor-
tant, the selected controller/monitor should be κ2,3 (i.e.,
securing sensor one) because it leads to the largest dis-
tance (9.74). Following the same logic, if two sensors can
be secured, m˜ = 2, they should be sensors two and three,
in terms of volume, and sensors one and two, in terms of
distance, i.e., we should select controllers/monitors κ1
(minimum volume) and κ3 (maximum distance), respec-
tively. Next, following the game-theoretic formulation in
Section 5.5, using Theorem 2 for to all possible combina-
tions of Γ, we compute all optimal controllers/monitors
and the corresponding volumes of the ellipsoidal outer
approximations. We use these volumes to construct the
matrix game H (given in Table 3) as introduced in Sec-
tion 5.5. Note that some entries of H are hyphens. This
indicates that the optimization problem used to compute
the ellipsoidal approximation was not feasible for that
combination of controller/monitor and Γ. From this H,
using 58, it is easy to verify that the security level for the
defender’s losses is 1538.31 which corresponds to con-
troller/monitor κ{1,2,3} (the the security strategy of the
defender), see Table 3. That is, by selecting κ{1,2,3}, we
ensure having a worst-case volume of 1538.31 regardless
of what sensors the attacker compromises. Finally, we
assign probabilities to the strategies of the attacker, in
the sense introduced in Section 5.5, and look for the con-
troller/monitor that minimizes the expected value of the
game. Using (59), it is easy to verify that, for the vector
of probabilities p = (0.4, 0.09, 0.3, 0.1, 0.1, 0.01, 0)T , the
strategy that minimizes the expected value of the game
is κ{1}, see Table 3. This controller/monitor leads to
H(1, ∗)p = 1135.43, which is the smallest for all H(i, ∗),
i ∈ {1, . . . , 7}.
6 Conclusion
We have provided mathematical tools – in terms of LMIs
– for quantifying the potential impact of sensor stealthy
attacks on the system dynamics. In particular, we have
given a result for computing ellipsoidal outer approxi-
mations on the set of states that stealthy attacks can
induce in the system. We have proposed to use the vol-
ume of these approximations and the distance to possi-
ble dangerous states as security metrics for NCSs. Then,
for given sensor attack selection matrix Γ, we have pro-
vide synthesis tools (in terms of semidefinite programs)
to redesign controllers and monitors such that the im-
pact of stealthy attacks is minimized and the required
attack-free system performance is guaranteed. Based on
these synthesis results, we have provided general guide-
lines for selecting optimal controllers/monitors when Γ
is unknown. In particular, we have proposed two sets
of techniques: sensor protection placement methods; and
game-theoretic techniques. We have presented extensive
computer simulations to illustrate the performance of
our results.
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A Monitor Design
We use Corollary 1 to obtain outer time-varying ellip-
soidal approximations of the reachable set of the estima-
tion error (13) driven by vk and ηk in the attack-free case
(δk = 0). Once we have this ellipsoid, we project it onto
the residual hyperplane to get the ellipsoid rTk Πrk = 1
of the monitor. Denote by ψe(k, e1, η(·), v(·)) the so-
lution of (13) at time instant k given the initial esti-
mation error e1 and the infinite disturbance sequences
η(·) := {η1, η2, . . .} and v(·) := {v1, v2, . . .}. The reach-
able set we seek to quantify is given by
Rek :=
{
e ∈ Rn
∣∣∣∣∣ e = ψe(k, e1, η(·), v(·)); e1 ∈ Rn,vTk vk ≤ v¯, ηTk ηk ≤ η¯, ∀k ∈ N.
}
.
(A.1)
Lemma 9 Consider the estimation error dynamics (13)
with matrices (Ap, Cp, E, F, L), the perturbation bounds
v¯, η¯ ∈ R>0, and assume no attacks to the system, i.e.,
δk = 0. For a given a ∈ (0, 1), if there exist constants
a1 = a
∗
1, . . . , aN = a
∗
N and matrix P = P∗ solution of
(8) with A = (Ap − LCp), N = 2, B1 = −LF , B2 = E,
W1 = (1/η¯)Im, W2 = (1/v¯)In, p1 = m, and p2 = n;
then, Rek ⊆ Eek := {e ∈ Rn|eTPee ≤ αek}, with Pe = P∗
and αek := a
k−1eT1 Pee1 +
(
(2 − a)(1 − ak−1))/(1 − a) ,
and the ellipsoid Eek has minimum volume in the sense
of Corollary 1.
Proof: The result follows Corollary 1. 
By Lemma 9, the trajectories of the estimation error
dynamics are contained in the time-varying ellipsoid
eTPee = αek. Having this ellipsoid, we look for the ma-
trix Π of the monitor leading to the minimum-volume
ellipsoid rTΠr = 1 satisfying, for k ≥ k∗ and some
k∗ ∈ N, rTk Πrk = (Cpek + ηk)TΠ(Cpek + ηk) ≤ 1 for
ek ∈ Eek and ηk such that ηTk ηk ≤ η¯.
Proposition 3 Consider the function αek defined in
Lemma 9 and define αe∞ := limk→∞ α
e
k = (2−a)/(1−a).
For every  ∈ R>0, there exists k∗(a, , e1,Pe) ∈ N such
that αek ≤ αe∞ +  for all k ≥ k∗(a, , e1,Pe).
Proof: The function αek can be written in terms of the
constant αe∞ as α
e
k = a
k−1eT1 P∗e1 + (1 − ak−1)αe∞.
Moreover, αek ≤ αe∞ +  ⇔ αek − αe∞ ≤  and
αek−αe∞ = ak−1
(
eT1 P∗e1−αe∞
)
. Because a < 1, inequal-
ity ak−1
(
eT1 P∗e1 − αe∞
) ≤ , can always be satisfied for
any  ∈ R>0 and sufficiently large k. 
Remark 9 By Proposition 3, for every  ∈ R>0,
there exists k∗ ∈ N such that αek ≤ αe∞ +  for all
k ≥ k∗. The least k∗ satisfying αek∗ ≤ αe∞ +  is given by
k∗(a, , e1,Pe) = min{k ∈ N|ak−1
(
eT1 Pee1 − αe∞
) ≤ }
(see the proof of Proposition 3 above). Notice that
αek ≤ αe∞ +  for k ≥ k∗ implies Eek ⊆ Ee , where
Ee := {e ∈ Rn|eTPee ≤ αe∞ + }, for all k ≥ k∗.
It follows that, for any  > 0, the estimation er-
ror ek is contained in ellipsoid e
TPee = αe∞ +  for
k ≥ k∗, i.e., Rek ⊆ Ee ∀ k ≥ k∗. Therefore, for a
fixed  (and corresponding k∗), the problem of find-
ing Π of the monitor amounts to finding Π such that
(Cpek + ηk)
TΠ(Cpek + ηk) ≤ 1 for all ek and ηk satisfy-
ing eTkPeη,vek ≤ αe∞+  and ηTk ηk ≤ η¯. This can be posed
as a convex optimization problem using the S-procedure.
Proposition 4 Let the conditions of Lemma 9 be satis-
fied and consider the corresponding matrix Pe ∈ Rn×n,
the function αek, the constant α
e
∞ = limk→∞ α
e
k = (2 −
a)/(1 − a), and some  ∈ R>0. If there exist τ1, τ2 ∈ R
and Π ∈ Rm×m solution of the following convex opti-
mization:
min
Π,τ1,τ2
− log det[Π],
s.t. Π ≥ 0, τ1 ≥ 0, τ2 ≥ 0, and f1 −(Cp)TΠ 0−ΠCp τ2Im −Π 0
0 0 f2
 ≥ 0,
f1 = τ1Pe − (Cp)TΠCp,
f2 = 1− τ1(αe∞ + )− τ2η¯;
(A.2)
then, for δk = 0 and k ≥ k∗(a, , e1,Pe) = min{k ∈
N|αek − αe∞ ≤ }, the monitor inequality rTk Πrk ≤ 1 is
satisfied for all ek and ηk satisfying e
T
kPeek ≤ αe∞ + 
and ηTk ηk ≤ η¯.
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Proof: By Lemma 9, Proposition 3, and Remark 9, for
any  ∈ R>0 and corresponding k∗ satisfying αek∗−αe∞ ≤
, the trajectories of estimation error dynamics (13) sat-
isfy eTkPeek ≤ αe∞+ for all k ≥ k∗. By the S-procedure
[5], if there exist τ1, τ2 ∈ R≥0 satisfying
(Cpek + ηk)
TΠ(Cpek + ηk)− 1
− τ1(eTkPeek − αe∞ − )− τ2(ηTk ηk − η¯) ≤ 0, (A.3)
then, (Cpek + ηk)
TΠ(Cpek + ηk) ≤ 1 is satisfied for all
ek and ηk satisfying e
T
kPeek ≤ αe∞ +  and ηTk ηk ≤ η¯.
Inequality (A.3) can be written as
vTk
 f1 −(Cp)TΠ 0−ΠCp τ2Im −Π 0
0 0 f2

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q
vk ≥ 0,
with vk :=
(
eTk , η
T
k , 1
)T
. The above inequality is satisfied
if and only if Q is positive semidefinite. Therefore, for
k ≥ k∗, rTk Πrk ≤ 1 for any Π solution of (A.2). Again,
to ensure that the ellipsoidal bound is as tight as pos-
sible, we minimize log det[Π−1] as this objective shares
the same minimizer with (det[Π])−1/2 and because for a
positive definite Π it is convex [5]. 
Remark 10 Using Proposition 4, we can design mon-
itors for every  ∈ R>0. If we want tight monitors, we
need small  because  ≈ 0 yields Eek ⊆ Ee ≈ Ee∞ for
k ≥ k∗. That is, the contribution of initial conditions to
the outer bound Ee on Eek used in Proposition 4 (see Re-
mark 9) to compute the monitor matrix Π has decreased
to a small value and mainly the effect of the perturba-
tions ηk and vk is taken into account when designing
the monitor matrix Π. However, depending on the ini-
tial conditions, too small  might result on very large k∗.
The values of  and k∗ are related through the expression
k∗ = min{k ∈ N|αek − αe∞ = ak−1
(
eT1 P∗e1 − αe∞
) ≤ }
introduced in Proposition 4. Note that, for eT1 P∗e1 ≤ αe∞,
k∗ = 1 for any  ∈ R>0, i.e,  can be selected arbitrar-
ily small. On the other hand, eT1 P∗e1 > αe∞ implies that
k∗ →∞ as → 0. That is, in this case, there is a trade-
off between conservative monitors and convergence time
when selecting .
A.1 Proof of Lemma 5
Assume that the conditions of Lemma 5 are satisfied
for some a ∈ (0, 1),  ∈ R>0, a1, a2 ∈ R, and matrices
(S,G,R). Because L = S−1R and Π = G, then R = SL,
G = Π, and the matrix inequalities in (48) take the form:
S > 0,

aS (Ap − LCp)TS 0 0
S(Ap − LCp) S −SLF SE
0 −(LF )TS 1−a1
η¯
Im 0
0 ETS 0 1−a2
v¯
In
 ≥ 0,
(A.4)
Π > 0,
[ 1
αe∞++η¯
S − (Cp)TΠCp −(Cp)TΠ
−ΠCp 1
αe∞++η¯
Im −Π
]
≥ 0.
(A.5)
The inequalities in (A.4) are of the form (6) in Proposi-
tion 1 with P = S, A = (Ap−LCp),N = 2, B1 = −LF ,
B2 = E, W1 = (1/η¯)Im, W2 = (1/v¯)In, p1 = m, and
p2 = n. Hence, because a, a1, a2 ∈ (0, 1) and a1+a2 ≥ a,
by Proposition 1, eTk Sek ≤ αek for all k ∈ N, ek solution
of (15) with δk = 0, α
e
k = a
k−1eT1 Se1 + α
e
∞(1 − ak−1),
and αe∞ = (2−a)/(1−a). Note that, for every  > 0, we
have αek ≤ αe∞+⇔ αek−αe∞ = ak−1
(
eT1 Se1−αe∞
) ≤ ,
and thus, because a ∈ (0, 1), αek ≤ αe∞ +  for all k ≥
k∗(a, , e1, S) = min{k ∈ N|ak−1
(
eT1 Se1−αe∞
) ≤ }. In-
equality αek ≤ αe∞+ for k ≥ k∗ implies eTk Sek ≤ αe∞+
for k ≥ k∗, i.e, for any  > 0, the estimation error
ek satisfies e
T
k Sek ≤ αe∞ +  for all k ≥ k∗. More-
over, because ηTk ηk ≤ η¯ for k ∈ N, it is easy to verify
that wTkQ1wk ≤ q for k ≥ k∗, where wk := (eTk , ηTk )T ,
Q1 := diag[S, Im] > 0, and q := α
e
∞++ η¯ ∈ R>0. Since
rk = C
pek + ηk, the monitor inequality, r
T
k Πrk ≤ 1, can
be written in terms of wk as w
T
kQ2wk ≤ 1, where
Q2 :=
[
(Cp)TΠCp (Cp)TΠ
ΠCp Π
]
.
Note that wTkQ1wk ≤ q ⇔ wTk
(
1
qQ1
)
wk ≤ 1, be-
cause q ∈ R>0 and Q1 > 0, and thus, if wTkQ2wk ≤
wTk
(
1
qQ1
)
wk, then w
T
kQ2wk ≤ 1 for k ≥ k∗ (be-
cause wTkQ1wk ≤ q only for k ≥ k∗). Inequality
wTkQ2wk ≤ wTk
(
1
qQ1
)
wk is satisfied for any wk ∈ Rn+m
if and only if 1qQ1−Q2 ≥ 0. The latter inequality equals
the right-hand side inequality in (A.5) and it is satisfied
by assumption. Therefore, wTkQ2wk = r
T
k Πrk ≤ 1 for
k ≥ k∗, Π = G, L = S−1R, and (a, a1, a2, , S,G,R)
satisfying (48). 
A.2 Proof of Lemma 8
Let ν be such that X˜(ν) > 0 and S(ν) ≥ 0. Be-
cause X˜(ν) > 0, by the Schur complement, Y > 0
and X − Y −1 > 0. Since Y X + V UT = I (see (34)),
then V UT = I − Y X < 0, i.e., the matrix V UT
is invertible. Hence, it is always possible to factorize
I − Y X as V UT = I − Y X with square and nonsin-
gular U and V . Invertible U and V implies that Y
and the matrix T3 := diag[Y,Y, I, I] are invertible. It
follows that the transformations X → YTXY = X˜(ν)
and S → T T3 ST3 = S(ν) are congruent. There-
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fore, X˜(ν) > 0 and S(ν) ≥ 0 imply X > 0 and
S ≥ 0 because X˜(ν) and S(ν) have the same signa-
ture as X and S, respectively. Because X(ν) > 0,
the matrices U and V are nonsingular. The latter
implies that the change of variables in (40a) and Y
are invertible and lead to unique (X , Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc)
by inverting (40a) and X˜(ν) = YTXY in (53),
and, by Lemma 7, this (Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc) leads to
supdk∈L2,dk 6=0(‖sk‖2 / ‖dk‖2) ≤ γ for ζ˜1 = 0. 
A.3 Projection of High Dimensional Ellipsoids onto
Coordinate Hyperplanes
Lemma 10 Consider the ellipsoid:
E :=
x ∈ R
n, y ∈ Rm
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
[
x
y
]T [
Q1 Q2
QT2 Q3
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q
[
x
y
]
= α
 ,
for some positive definite matrix Q ∈ R(n+m)×(n+m)
and constant α ∈ R>0. The projection E ′ of E onto the
x-hyperplane is given by the ellipsoid:
E ′ := {x ∈ Rn ∣∣xT [Q1 −Q2Q−13 QT2 ]x = α} .
Proof: The matrix Q is positive definite and thus Q1 ∈
Rn×n and Q3 ∈ Rm×m are nonsingular. It follows that
Q can be factorized as:[
Q1 Q2
QT2 Q3
]
=
[
In 0
−Q−13 QT2 Im
]T [
Q1 −Q2Q−13 QT2 0
0 Q3
]
×
[
In 0
−Q−13 QT2 Im
]
.
Introduce the change of coordinates:[
x¯
y¯
]
:=
[
In 0
−Q−13 QT2 Im
] [
x
y
]
. (A.6)
In these coordinates, the ellipsoid E is given by
E =

x¯ ∈ Rn
y¯ ∈ Rm
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
[
x¯
y¯
]T [
Q1 −Q2Q−13 QT2 0
0 Q3
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q¯
[
x¯
y¯
]
= α
 .
The matrix Q¯ is block diagonal; therefore, in the new
coordinates, the projection of E onto y¯ = 0 (the x¯-
hyperplane) and the intersection of E with y¯ = 0 are
equal. The intersection with y¯ = 0 (and thus the pro-
jection onto y¯ = 0) is simply given by E x¯ := {(x¯, y¯) ∈
E|y¯ = 0} = {x¯ ∈ Rn|x¯T [Q1 − Q2Q−13 QT2 ]x¯ = α}. ThisE x¯ provides an expression for all the points of E that
lie on the x¯-hyperplane. However, from (A.6), note that
x¯ = x; therefore, E x¯ = E ′ and E ′ provides the locus for
all the points of E that lie on the x-hyperplane. 
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